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Purpose, Prudence, and Path: Reevaluating
the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine in the
Context of Opioid Litigation
ABBY CUNNINGHAM1
The primary jurisdiction doctrine is a judicially created discretionary
tool which allows a court to halt proceedings in an action where a regulatory agency’s interpretation of an issue within the matter is sin qua non to
the full and final determination of the case. The doctrine first took shape in
the early years of the 20th century and continues to be used today. The contours of the doctrine, however, have remained somewhat indistinct; its purposes of promoting uniformity, utilizing agency expertise, and promoting a
proper working have not always been considered; and courts have failed to
properly implement the doctrine. Establishing definite doctrinal boundaries
and application principles is a paramount concern. The doctrine is applicable in almost any litigation context as long as an issue within the matter
comes under the authority of a regulatory body. Civil plaintiffs, and commercial defendants, will be best served by establishing clear guidelines for
the doctrine’s use. This Note discusses the origins of the doctrine; reaffirms
its core purposes; illustrates its current amorphous and borderless shape
by analyzing the doctrine against the backdrop of the current wave of opioid litigation; and suggests a method courts should use to properly apply
the doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Judicial doctrines are valuable tools that trial courts can use to adjudicate disputes, provided the courts engage in proper analysis to determine
whether the doctrine should apply. The primary jurisdiction doctrine is a judicially created discretionary doctrine designed to come into play when a
case properly within the jurisdiction of a trial court involves issues implicating the regulatory authority of an administrative body.2 The doctrine allows
a court to halt proceedings in an action where an agency’s interpretation of
an issue within the matter is sin qua non to the full and final determination
of the case.3 The doctrine is a U.S. Supreme Court creation which came into
being during the nascent years of administrative law.4 The Court recognized
the potential for problems in adjudicating issues where the authority of both
court and administrative agency overlap.5 The primary jurisdiction doctrine
was designed to address the problems arising from potentially inconsistent
rulings between court and agency by allowing the agency to have the first
say, thus promoting uniformity in the administration of law.6 Over time, and
as the body of administrative law grew, the proper utilization of agency
2. See generally Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 103740 (1964).
3. See id.; United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
4. See Jaffe, supra note 2.
5. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 441, 446 (1907).
6. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303-04 (1976) (“Even when
common-law rights and remedies survive and the agency in question lacks the power to confer
immunity from common-law liability, it may be appropriate to refer specific issues to an
agency for initial determination where that procedure would secure ‘[u]niformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency’.”) (quoting Far E. Conference v. U.S., 342 U.S. 574, 574-75 (1952)).
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expertise became a goal of the doctrine,7 as did fostering a proper working
relationship between courts and agencies.8
Utilizing the doctrine to achieve its core purposes, however, has always
been predicated on the wisdom of doing so9—a court must not only ask
whether referral will achieve a core purpose of the doctrine, but also ask
whether the matter is important enough to the resolution of the case that the
court should consult the agency at all. The question is one of prudence and
soundness, and not necessarily one of jurisdiction.10 To answer this question,
a court must look to the arguments in the pleadings and considerations outside the instant litigation, if any, which may favor referral.11 A court must
choose an appropriate method to “refer” the pertinent issue to the agency
after it decides primary jurisdiction applies, which may include staying the
case or dismissing without prejudice to allow the parties to pursue the issue
before the agency, 12 certifying a question to the agency,13 or requesting that
the agency submit an amicus brief.14 The case continues once the question is
answered or the issue resolved, if the agency’s involvement did not bring
finality to the matter.15
The doctrine has met criticism despite its ostensible utility as a mechanism to aid both court and agency in carrying out their respective regulatory
7. Far East, 342 U.S. 574, 574-75 (1952).
8. See W. Pac., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956).
9. The doctrine is a prudential one, discussed more fully in Part I, infra.
10. Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 304 (1973) (upholding the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine absent a determination of actual jurisdiction of the
Commodities Exchange Commission over an issue in a case, stating, “there is sufficient statutory support for administrative authority in this area that the agency should at least be requested to institute proceedings.”).
11. See, e.g., Splitrock Props., Inc. v. Qwest Commc’ns Corp., No. 08-412-KES,
2010 WL 2867126, at *2-3, *12 (D.S.D. July 20, 2010) (holding that, in addition to agency
expertise, the fact that more than sixteen other active cases sought to address the same FCC
issue, at least five of which were stayed pursuant to primary jurisdiction, weighed in favor of
a stay).
12. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993) (“[The primary jurisdiction doctrine]
requires the court to enable a ‘referral’ to the agency, staying further proceedings so as to give
the parties reasonable opportunity to seek an administrative ruling.”).
13. Int’l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. United Contractors
Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384, 400 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding trial courts may certify questions to the National Labor Relations Board) (amended by 494 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1974)).
14. Ryan v. Chemlawn Corp., 935 F.2d 129, 132 (7th Cir. 1991) (“If the district court
believed that it needed specific information from the EPA to decide this case, it could have
asked the EPA to file an amicus brief.”).
15. Ricci, 409 U.S. at 305 (holding that a decision of the Commodities Exchange
Commission would not need to be litigated again by the court holding jurisdiction over the
original case, saying, “[t]he adjudication of the Commission, if it is forthcoming, will be subject to judicial review and would obviate any necessity for the antitrust court to relitigate the
issues actually disposed of by the agency decision.”).
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duties.16 The lack of structure and discretionary nature of the doctrine has
allowed confusion to blossom in the courts.17 Judge Posner aptly described
how the primary jurisdiction doctrine has developed two distinct faces, with
one face resembling “exclusive agency jurisdiction” requiring a court to surrender the claim to an agency,18 and another that appears to be a close cousin
of the Burford abstention doctrine.19 This interpretive dichotomy has resulted
in inconsistent application and differing standards of review from appellate
courts.20 Amidst the confusion, judicial decisions have shifted away from
considering all three of the doctrine’s original purposes towards placing
heavy emphasis on the purpose of utilizing agency expertise.21 As such,
courts have not been concerned with whether the court should involve an
agency, but rather whether courts are equipped to address the kind of issue

16. See, e.g., Paula K. Knippa, Note, Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and the Cicumforaneuous Litigant, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1289, 1292 (2007) (discussing how courts often
misunderstand and misapply the doctrine’s purposes and functions, arguing that, “[n]ot only
does such incoherence result in arbitrary or even improper application of the doctrine, it deprives parties of proper notice as to what they can reasonably expect from the judicial machinery they seek to engage in pursuit of their claims.”).
17. Id.
18. Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[The primary jurisdiction
doctrine] applies only when, in a suit involving a regulated firm but not brought under the
regulatory statute itself, an issue arises that is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
regulatory agency to resolve, although the agency's resolution of it will usually be subject to
judicial review.”).
19. Id. (“Cases in which a court refers an issue to an agency because of the agency's
superior expertise . . . rather than because of the agency's jurisdiction, are not felicitously described as cases of primary jurisdiction. They are akin to those Burford abstention cases that
like the granddaddy of the line, Burford v. Sun Oil Co. . . .”); See also Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. 315, 332-34 (1943).
20. See Nicholas A. Lucchetti, One Hundred Years of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: But What Standard of Review is Appropriate?, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 849, 867 (2007)
(“[C]ourts are currently split on whether the doctrine is discretionary or a matter of law. No
doubt this split stems from the unusual nature of the doctrine, blending prudential elements as
well as elements generally accepted as matters of law.”); Bryson Santaguida, The Primary
Jurisdiction Two-Step, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2007) (discussing how “[c]ircuits currently disagree on how to review primary jurisdiction rulings. Some circuits review de novo,
while others review for abuse of discretion. Both standards lack sufficient precision,” and
discussing how a two-step review akin to that employed for abstention doctrines is appropriate).
21. See, e.g., Tassy v. Brunswick Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 296 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“As the origin and evolution of the primary jurisdiction doctrine demonstrate, the reasons for
its existence and the purposes it serves are twofold: the desire for uniformity and the reliance
on administrative expertise.”); Ryan v. Chemlawn, 935 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
decision whether to apply it depends upon a case by case determination of whether, in view
of the purposes of the statute involved and the relevance of administrative expertise to the
issue at hand, the court ought to defer initially to the administrative agency.”).
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up for referral consideration.22 Even where courts have made referrals, the
decisions to refer are often devoid of discussion on why one referral mechanism was chosen over another.23 Not all referral methods are equal; some can
result in litigants experiencing seemingly interminable delays.24
Despite flaws in its application, the doctrine’s original values can still
prove beneficial to courts, agencies, and litigants.25 This Note aims to minimize the gulf between how the doctrine is applied and how it should be applied by suggesting courts return to a simpler method of analysis: for proper
application of the doctrine, a court should determine that (1) referral will
achieve uniformity, properly utilize expertise, or promote comity between
court and agency; (2) prudence dictates the matter should be referred; and (3)
the chosen referral method avoids causing undue hardship to the parties, to
the extent possible. To demonstrate how these principles should be applied,
this Note will examine the primary jurisdiction doctrine against the backdrop
of parens patriae suits against opioid manufacturers.26
22. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1035 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (holding application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine is not appropriate in an
action alleging false or misleading advertising because, “this is not a technical area in which
the FDA has greater technical expertise than the courts—every day courts decide whether
conduct is misleading.”); accord Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1124
(N.D. Cal. 2011); Ricos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 522, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2011);
see also In Re J.H. Ware Trucking, Inc., 159 B.R. 527, 532 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993) (declining
to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine because a determination of what constitutes common
carriage is well within the province of courts, stating, “[c]ourts are well equipped to apply a
totality of circumstances test to determine the nature of transportation and absent a compelling
need for the expertise of an administrative agency, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not compel referral.”).
23. See Watkins v. Vital Pharms., Inc., No. CV 12-09374 SJO (JCx), 2013 WL
5972174 at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013) (the court notes that it may stay or dismiss, and
elects to dismiss, but does not explain why it chose dismissal over a stay); cf. Stevens v. Bos.
Sci. Corp., 152 F. Supp. 3d 527, 535-37 (S.D. W. Va. 2016) (electing to stay, explaining that
if the matter is dismissed the parties would have to start over before the agency).
24. See Diana R. H. Winters, Inappropriate Referral: The Use of Primary Jurisdiction in Food-Labeling Litigation, Symposium, 41 AM. J. L. & MED. 240, 256 (2015) (“Referral
to FDA under the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not mean that FDA is then required to
take action in any specific timeframe. In fact, there is no mechanism for petitioners to challenge undue delay if no official petition has been filed. Even if the parties do choose to file a
petition to expedite the process, FDA is statutorily permitted to extend the decision-making
process indefinitely.”).
25. See Christine H. Monahan, Private Enforcement of the Affordable Care Act: Toward an “Implied Warranty of Legality” in Health Insurance, 126 YALE L. J. 1118, 1170
(2017) (“[S]o long as courts exercise care, the primary jurisdiction doctrine need not be a bar
to litigation. . . . Instead, it may provide a useful mechanism for incorporating agency input
while preserving a consumer's right to judicial recourse.”).
26. This Note addresses only a procedural aspect within certain cases in the present
wave of opioid litigation. Assigning fault, liability, blame, or determining whether opioids are
safe for long-term use are outside the scope of this effort.
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Use and abuse of opioids in the United States has reached a fever pitch.
A recent report from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that
opioid abuse caused the deaths of over 300,000 people in the United States
between 1999 and 2015.27 The CDC estimates that, out of the total number,
over 215,000 deaths resulted from overdoses of prescription opioid analgesics.28 The current rate at which Americans die from opioid abuse stands at
ninety-one people per day.29 Numerous lawsuits against opioid manufacturers have attempted to assign liability for the massive economic cost of addiction, many to no avail.30 One state revised its view on wrongful conduct as a
collateral bar in light of the opioid epidemic, deciding to adopt the comparative fault rule to allow addicts—even those who admit to committing criminal acts to fraudulently obtain prescription drugs—to sue pharmacies and
doctors for fueling their addiction.31
Two recent suits against opioid manufacturers received different treatment under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.32 In 2014, two California counties and the City of Chicago, with the help of common outside counsel,
brought parallel parens patriae suits against prescription opioid analgesic
manufacturers, alleging that the companies aggressively promoted drugs they
knew to be unsafe for long-term treatment of pain using deceptive marketing
practices.33 The California case was stayed under rationale supporting the

27. Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates
[http://perma.cc/DY8PRUUT]; CDC Wonder: Underlying Cause of Death 1999–2015, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/help/ucd.html [hereinafter Underlying Cause
of Death] [http://perma.cc/AGK7-DEFC].
28. Underlying Cause of Death, supra note 27; Opioid Overdose: Understanding the
Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [hereinafter Understanding the Epidemic] [http://perma.cc/DJ9VE2ZH] (“We now know that overdoses from prescription opioids are a driving factor in the
15-year increase in opioid overdose deaths. Since 1999, the amount of prescription opioids
sold in the U.S. nearly quadrupled, yet there has not been an overall change in the amount of
pain that Americans report. Deaths from prescription opioids—drugs like oxycodone, hydrocodone, and methadone—have more than quadrupled since 1999.”).
29. Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 28.
30. See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against
Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117 (2014) (surveying lawsuits against Purdue
Pharma and others).
31. Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below in Mingo Cty., 235 W. Va.
283, 298 (2015).
32. California v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 30-2014-00725287-CU-BT-CXC (Cal.
Super. Ct. May 21, 2014) (hereinafter referred to as “California v. Purdue”); Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 14-cv-04361 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2014) (hereinafter referred to as “Chicago v. Purdue”).
33. See generally Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32;
Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32.
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purposes of the primary jurisdiction doctrine,34 but the court handling the
Chicago matter summarily rejected applying the doctrine—twice.35 Analysis
of the holdings in these substantially similar cases reveals the inconsistent
treatment the primary jurisdiction doctrine receives in courts. Further examination shows that proper application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
could have yielded a different, more unified result.
Part I provides an evaluation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine and
explores its most critical components. Part II presents the background of the
opioid crisis and surrounding litigation by discussing the role of the FDA, a
brief history of opioids, and the parens patriae litigation. Part III attempts to
reconcile the divergent holdings of the California and Chicago courts and
proposes how the doctrine should have been analyzed and applied.
PART I: EXAMINATION OF THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
The primary jurisdiction doctrine is a judicially created mechanism designed to assist courts in addressing situations where the power of the court
and one or more federal agencies overlap.36 The underlying reasoning behind
the doctrine is sound. The doctrine grew out of the Supreme Court’s early
twentieth century recognition that the growth of administrative regulatory
schemes would require courts to coordinate their efforts with that of federal
agencies to achieve uniform and cohesive application of general policy objectives.37 The goals the primary jurisdiction doctrine seeks to achieve include promotion of uniformity consistent with the policy goals of the regulatory agency under whose purview rests certain issues arising within a case,
the rational exercise of judicial review at the trial level by utilizing an
agency’s expertise, and fostering a “proper working relationship” between
courts and federal agencies.38 To accomplish these ends, a court is permitted
to refer those issues outside the scope of its conventional experience to the
agency with requisite specialized knowledge or expertise.39

34. Order of Aug. 27, 2015, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 2-3.
35. Order of May 8, 2015, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32 (first denial); Order of
Sept. 29, 2016, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32 (second denial).
36. See Jaffe, supra note 2 at 1038-40.
37. See Port of Bos. Marine v. Rederiaktibolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 68
(1970).
38. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 673 (2002) (Breyer,
J. concurring).
39. Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 574, 574 (1952).

8

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9-1

This part studies the foundational decisions shaping Supreme Court jurisprudence involving the primary jurisdiction doctrine.40 Here, the doctrine’s main goals are outlined through examination of the Supreme Court
decisions in which the separate goals are first developed. The foundations of
the doctrine trace back to a series of early twentieth century U.S. Supreme
Court decisions invoking questions regarding the authority of the Interstate
Commerce Commission over common law claims involving shippers and
carriers.41 The Court’s manifest concern in these early decisions was uniformity and consistency between interpretations of the Commission and the
judiciary in carrying out congressional intent.42 As such, the Court put forward uniformity in administration of laws the fundamental guiding purpose
in its first decision establishing the doctrine.43 Decades later, two other decisions added contours to the doctrine’s rationale, adding to its intended purposes promoting the use of agency expertise when such expertise is implicated, and facilitating a proper working relationship between courts and
agencies where agency interpretation will aid in bringing resolution to a complicated matter.44 The last, and arguably, most important decision discussed
here unveils the true power of the doctrine, showing that proper application
of the doctrine can result from the implication of agency authority, rather
than jurisdiction.45
A.

The Purpose of Promoting Uniformity

The doctrine’s foundational origin is articulated in Texas and Pacific
Railway Company v. Abilene Cotton Oil Company, where the court recognized the impropriety of subjecting a company to separate and possibly
40. The primary jurisdiction doctrine has been addressed or discussed by the Supreme
Court dozens of times since its foundational 1907 decision in Abilene Cotton v. Texas and
Pacific Railway.
41. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants’ Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922) (“Whenever a rate, rule, or practice of carriers is attacked as unreasonable or as unjustly discriminatory, there must be preliminary resort to the Interstate Commerce Commission, whether the
function exercised is in its nature administrative, because directed to the determination of future practice, or judicial, because seeking to determine whether the shipper has been wronged,
since in either case the inquiry is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters,
and uniformity can be secured only if its determination is left to the Commission.”); Loomis
v. Lehigh Valley, 240 U.S. 43, 50-51 (1916) (needed ICC interpretation on regulations surrounding grain doors); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Am. Tie & Timber Co., 234 U.S. 138 (1914)
(needed ICC interpretation of tariffs for railroad ties); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton
Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 441, 446 (1907).
42. See Jaffe, supra note 2 at 582.
43. Abilene, 204 U.S. at 441, 446.
44. United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 65-66 (1956); Far East, 342 U.S.
at 574-75.
45. See Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 307 (1973).
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disparate interpretations of the same issue of fact.46 In Abilene, a cotton oil
shipper sued the Texas and Pacific Railway Company in a state law cause of
action alleging the shipper’s rates were unreasonably excessive.47 Texas and
Pacific asserted that the trial court lacked the authority to decide the reasonableness of the rates in dispute, arguing that the authority to make such a
determination was the exclusive province of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICA).48 However, the ICA also provided that Abilene could elect
either to “make a complaint to the Commission,” or “bring suit . . . for the
recovery of damages . . . in any district or circuit court of the United States
of competent jurisdiction,” and that Abilene’s common law remedies would
remain untouched.49 Having found Abilene’s election of a common law remedy was preserved by the savings provisions within the ICA, the trial court
rejected the argument of Texas and Pacific and subsequently found the disputed rates unreasonable.50
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on later appeal, because the
ultimate outcome of the matter depended heavily upon the statutory construction of the ICA.51 The Court conceded that any statute’s express preservation
of a right to pursue an action at common law should not be disturbed by the
statute’s implied grant of unilateral decision-making authority to a regulatory
body,52 but when the preservation of rights frustrates the statute’s overall purpose and objective, the preservation should be withdrawn.53 Notably, the Abilene Court never questioned the capability of courts or juries to determine
the reasonableness of a shipping company’s rates.54 Rather, the Court concluded that determinations of reasonableness would vary from case to case,
and the creation of varied standards of reasonableness is completely at odds

46. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907).
47. Id. at 426.
48. Id. at 430, 437-38; see also Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379-81 (1887).
In fact, a federal statute, the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), did command that rates charged
by common carriers be “reasonable and just,” and required carriers to submit their rate schedules in advance to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Texas and Pacific’s argument
that the ICC was responsible for determining reasonableness centered around the requirement
for rate schedule submission, annual reporting, investigation by the commission, and the statutory penalties for various violations, including failure to file a rate schedule. §§ 6, 10, 13, 15,
20, 24 Stat. at 380-87.
49. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 382, 387 (1887).
50. Abilene, 204 U.S. at 432.
51. Id. at 433-34. The issue the Court was most concerned with addressing was the
interaction between the explicit “savings” clauses and the determination of reasonableness by
the ICC. Id. at 433-34.
52. Abilene, 204 U.S. at 436-37. The Court finds the ICC’s duty to determine reasonableness is implied and encompassed within its duty to uniformly administer the ICA. Id.
53. Id. at 437.
54. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440 (1907).
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with the purpose of the ICA.55 The Court thus repealed the common law savings provisions of the ICA not because the Interstate Commerce Commission
had superior ability to determine reasonableness of shipping rates, but because Congress allocated that duty to the ICC, and because allowing courts
and juries to make inevitable discordant determinations of reasonableness
would frustrate congressional intent by destroying the act’s fundamental purpose.56
B.

The Purpose of Proper Utilization of Agency Expertise

The doctrinal purpose of promoting the beneficial use of agency expertise is articulated in Far East Conference v. United States.57 In Far East, a
voluntary “conference” of maritime carriers who transported freight destined
for the Far East constructed a dual-rate system where shippers who exclusively engaged the services conference members received a lower rate than
shippers who did not.58 The United States brought an antitrust action against
the Conference because of its unfiled dual-rate system.59 The Conference
moved for dismissal, arguing that the kind of issues presented in the dualrate schedule were issues better suited for preliminary consideration by the
Federal Maritime Board than the district court.60 The Supreme Court agreed,
finding the issues presented within the case were factual questions involving
the shipping trade requiring “a high degree of expert and technical
knowledge” outside the general scope of judicial experience, but fully within
the general scope of the experience and expertise of the Board.61 Thus, in
recognizing the value and authority of agency interpretations, the Far East
Court stated, “[i]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional
experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative

55. Id.
56. See id. at 446. Speaking of the savings clause found in §22 of the ICA, the Court
stated, “[t]his clause, however, cannot in reason be construed as continuing in shippers a common-law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the
provisions of the act. In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself.” Id. See also
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 299 (1976) (in summarizing the effect of the
savings clauses in Abilene, the Court said referral to the ICC was necessary due to “an irreconcilable conflict between the statutory scheme and the persistence of common-law remedies.”). But see Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 290 (1922) (distinguishing Abilene, holding that uniformity in an agency’s administration of a law is not threatened where the issue before the court is purely a question of law).
57. See generally Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
58. Id. at 571-72.
59. Id. at 572.
60. Id. at 572-73.
61. Id. at 573 (quoting U.S. Navigation Co. v. Cunard, 284 U.S. 474, 485 (1932)).
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discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter
should not be passed over.”62
The Far East Court added an additional contour to the purpose of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, where the goal of achieving rational exercise
of judicial resources is realized when a court refers a matter within its purview, but outside its expertise, to an agency with requisite specialized experience.63 Further, the decision was the first step towards reshaping the character of primary jurisdiction doctrine from a tool to identify exclusive jurisdiction into a tool meant to facilitate appropriate use of agency expertise.64
In this way, the Far East decision made a substantive departure from Abilene.65 Far East reiterates the assertion that the purpose of achieving uniformity is served when the court allows the relevant agency the opportunity
to address some matter in the claim falling within its sphere of expertise, but
adds that the matter subject to agency review is not cognizable by the agency
alone but also by the court.66
C.

The Purpose of Promoting a Proper Working Relationship Between
Court and Agency

Fostering a cohesive working relationship between agencies and courts
was another doctrinal purpose first put forward by the Far East Court and
then further developed four years later in United States v. Western Pacific
Railroad Co.67 The decision is widely held to articulate the modern framework of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.68 The underlying dispute in Western Pacific turned on the definitions of an incendiary bomb and reasonable
rates.69 In Western Pacific, three railroads transported a total of 211 shipments of steel bomb casings filled with napalm gel on behalf of the United

62. Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
63. Id. at 574-75 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191 (1939)).
64. See Aaron J. Lockwood, The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine: Competing Standards of Appellate Review, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 713 (2007).
65. Id. Beginning with the Far East decision, the Court began to move decidedly
away from Abilene’s somewhat rigid doctrinal construction. Id. at 715.
66. Far East, 342 U.S. at 576-77. This proposition serves to support the idea that the
primary jurisdiction doctrine is distinct from “exhaustion of remedies,” where the claim is first
cognizable by an agency, only arriving before a court after all avenues for redress with the
agency have been exhausted. See also United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956).
67. See Far East, 342 U.S. at 575. The Far East Court explained that in its holding it
was applying the vision of Justice Stone in United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191 (1939),
which proposed that court and agency are not independent regulatory bodies competing for
dominance but rather a collaborative and complementary system where both exist as a “means
adopted to attain the prescribed end.”
68. See Lockwood, supra note 64, at 714.
69. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. at 62-63.
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States Army.70 The Government refused to pay the rate charged by the railroads and instead paid the rate it considered appropriate.71 The railroads
brought suit against the United States in the Court of Claims for the difference between the rate paid and the rate allegedly due.72 The Government argued that the action should be stayed to give the ICC an opportunity to review
the reasonableness of the rates pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.73
The Court of Claims refused to refer any portion of the matter to the Commission and rejected all of the Government’s arguments and defenses, granting summary judgment to the railroads.74
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the issue of tariff
construction is generally a matter “cognizable in the courts,” the circumstances of the case warranted consulting the ICC because its expertise and
skill would bring clarity to the matter.75 The Court succinctly summarized
the primary jurisdiction doctrine:
Primary jurisdiction . . . applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competency of an administrative body; in such a
case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its views.76
In addressing when the doctrine should be applied, the Court stated,
“[n]o fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
In every case the question is whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its
70. Id. at 60. Some of the napalm incendiaries that the Western Pacific Railroad Company shipped between 1948 and 1950 may have ultimately been supplied to Greece to combat
a communist uprising and used during the Korean conflict, both of which were complex sociopolitical issues. For a detailed history of napalm gel and the use of incendiary bombs in warfare, see ROBERT M. NEER, NAPALM: AN AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 91-95 (Harv. Univ. Press
2013).
71. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. at 61. The ICC established different rate classes for shipments depending on the type of shipment. Carriers who transported shipments containing incendiary bombs could charge a higher rate than other products. In Western Pacific, the Government refused to pay the costlier first-class rate for the shipments because it asserted the
casings were not incendiary bombs. Id.
72. See W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. at 60-61.
73. See id. at 61-62. The Government argued that its shipments fell outside the definition of an incendiary bomb put forth by the ICC. The Government contended that the casings
were not actually bombs because the white phosphorous “burster” caps and fuses required to
ignite the napalm gel were not incorporated into the casings. Id.
74. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. at 62.
75. Id. at 68-70.
76. Id. at 63-64.
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application in the particular litigation.”77 Put another way, a court properly
applies the doctrine in situations implicating the need for uniformity in administration and regulation or the need for an agency’s specialized expertise,
and referral to an agency for determination serves as a means to achieve either or both of those ends.78
The Court found the issue of tariff construction, as it pertained to
whether the shipped products were dangerous incendiary bombs, was so intertwined with the question of reasonableness of the rate that “the same factors [would be] determinative on both issues.”79 The Court explained that the
primary jurisdiction doctrine “allocat[es] the law-making power over certain
aspects of commercial relations. It transfers from court to agency the power
to determine some of the incidents of such relations.”80 Given the question of
reasonableness of a tariff rate involved specialized knowledge of the shipping
industry, which the Court held was the unique province of the ICC, and that
the ICC had not formally reviewed the tariff or offered prior clarification on
its specific factors, the Court held the court of claims had not properly allocated the issues within the case between itself and the agency.81 In so holding,
the Court recognized the authority of courts, but also emphasized that for the
primary jurisdiction to function properly, courts should behave in a way that
promotes a proper working relationship between themselves and agencies by
appropriately allocating responsibility.82
D.

Prudence, Soundness, and the Question of “Should”

The Western Pacific decision is likely the primary jurisdiction doctrine’s most cited opinion because its ultimate holding describes the doctrine
in relatively simple terms. The doctrine may apply to a claim discernible by
both a court and agency when, in the court’s discretion, referring the matter
will achieve uniformity, properly utilize agency expertise, or achieve a
proper balance between the powers of the agency and the court.83 The decision reinforces the proposition that the Court intended the primary

77. See United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 69.
80. Id. at 65 (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered, 102 U. PA.
L. REV. 577, 583-84 (1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. See United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 62, 69-70 (1956).
82. Id. at 69-70.
83. Id. at 69. The Court stated, “By no means do we imply that matters of tariff construction are never cognizable in the courts. We adhere to the distinctions laid down in Great
Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co. . . . which call for decision based on the particular
facts of each case.” Id.
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jurisdiction doctrine to be a flexible judicial tool.84 But while Western Pacific
is acknowledged for achieving a degree of synthesis between both Abilene
and Far East, its most important aspect is often overlooked.85 The most important aspect of the Court’s holding is not how the several purposes of the
doctrine coalesce, but rather how the Court finds the applicability of primary
jurisdiction depends on whether the agency ought to be involved.86
The Supreme Court later established that seeking an agency’s involvement is a paramount concern, even when actual jurisdiction is left undetermined; the Court in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange addressed
whether the primary jurisdiction doctrine was properly invoked to stay proceedings in an antitrust action against a futures trading exchange whose rules
and operation fell under the regulatory authority of the Commodities Exchange Commission.87 Ricci purchased a membership in the Exchange with
money from the Siegel Trading Company.88 The dispute arose when, as Ricci
alleged, the Exchange and the Trading Company conspired to restrain Ricci’s
business in violation of the Sherman Act by transferring his membership in
the Exchange to someone else outside the Exchange’s procedural due process
rules.89 The Court held the stay was proper, finding the Commission’s determination of whether the Exchange violated its rules or the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) would ultimately aid in determining the outcome of the
case.90 The Commission’s decision would be dispositive of the antitrust issue
if the Commission found the Exchange in violation, but if it found no violation, the decision would place the lower court in a better position to

84. See Lockwood, supra note 64, at 707. The primary jurisdiction doctrine is a catchall doctrine by design, applicable to any regulatory body and employable by any court. Id.
85. See id. at 713.
86. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. at 65. Speaking of the multiple issues presented, the Court
stated,
[t]hus the first question presented is whether effectuation of the
statutory purposes of the Interstate Commerce Act requires that
the Interstate Commerce Commission should first pass on the
construction of the tariff in dispute here; this, in turn, depends
on whether the question raises issues of transportation policy
which ought to be considered by the Commission in the interests
of a uniform and expert administration of the regulatory scheme
laid down by that Act.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
87. Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 290-91 (1973).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 301-02. The Court’s greatest concern was whether consulting the Commission would materially aid the lower court in the underlying antitrust action. Id. at 305.
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definitively determine whether antitrust immunity applied.91 Thus, by consulting the Commission for its views, the lower court would achieve uniformity in regulation, utilize the expertise of the agency, and achieve proper
balance between its powers and those of the Commission.
The significance in the Ricci holding, however, lies in that the need to
consult the Commission for its views arose out of the wisdom of involving
the Commission in the matter, not out of its jurisdiction over the dispute. In
fact, the Court explicitly refused to rationalize upholding the stay based on
the Commission’s jurisdictional authority.92 Instead, the Court found the
facts of the case implicating the Commission’s authority were strong enough
to justify a stay under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.93 The Court said:
We make no claim that the Commission has authority to decide either the question of immunity as such or that any rule
of the Exchange takes precedence over antitrust policies. Rather, we simply recognize that the Congress has established
a specialized agency that would determine either that a
membership rule of the Exchange has been violated or that
it has been followed. Either judgment would require determination of facts and the interpretation and application of
the Act and Exchange rules. And either determination will
be of great help to the antitrust court in arriving at the essential accommodation between the antitrust and the regulatory
regimes.94
Thus, Ricci establishes that the propriety of a stay or dismissal under the
primary jurisdiction doctrine turns closely on the prudence and soundness of
deferring to an agency prior to fully litigating the matter. Questions of prudence turn on whether the agency’s involvement will help to achieve proper
resolution of the underlying dispute.95 The soundness of the decision to
91. Ricci, 409 U.S. at 306 (“The adjudication of the Commission, if it is forthcoming,
will be subject to judicial review and would obviate any necessity for the antitrust court to
relitigate the issues actually disposed of by the agency decision.”).
92. Id. at 304 (“We need not finally decide the jurisdictional issue for present purposes, but there is sufficient statutory support for administrative authority in this area that the
agency should at least be requested to institute proceedings.”).
93. See id. at 302-04. The Court’s finding that the Commission’s “administrative authority” in the field was enough to support a stay under the primary jurisdiction doctrine was
based upon the Court’s understanding of the agency’s position in the regulatory scheme surrounding commodities exchanges, the Commission’s oversight of the rulemaking process of
the Exchange, the Commission’s familiarity with the kinds of issues presented, and that referral would carry out Congressional intent. Id.
94. Id. at 307.
95. See Ricci, 409 U.S. at 305-06.
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invoke the doctrine depends upon whether the issue referred resonates with
a core function granted the agency by Congress.96 Neither consideration
hinges on the agency’s jurisdiction over the matter its determination will affect.97 The timing of the Ricci decision coincided with a period of rapid
growth of administrative programs.98 Today, the current administrative law
scheme is so comprehensive that many cases involving a party or a cause of
action related to a regulated industry could potentially trace back at least
some issue within the matter to the authority of a regulatory body.99 As such,
the primary jurisdiction doctrine is conceivably applicable wherever an
agency’s power is implicated. However, courts are somewhat reluctant to relinquish control over such a broad swath of cases by engaging in wholesale
application of the doctrine,100 and, in truth, application of the doctrine in
every possible instance runs contrary to the doctrine’s overarching

96. See Ricci, 409 U.S. at 305-06.
97. See id. Speaking of the wisdom of consulting the Commission and how it would
aid the litigation, the Court stated:
We also think it very likely that a prior agency adjudication of this dispute will be a material
aid in ultimately deciding whether the Commodity Exchange Act forecloses this antitrust suit,
a matter that seems to depend in the first instance on whether the transfer of Ricci's membership was in violation of the Act for failure to follow Exchange rules. That issue in turn appears
to pose issues of fact and questions about the scope, meaning, and significance of Exchange
membership rules. These are matters that should be dealt with in the first instance by those
especially familiar with the customs and practices of the industry and of the unique marketplace involved in this case. They are matters typically lying at the heart of an administrative
agency's task and here they appear to be matters that Congress has placed within the jurisdiction of the Commodity Exchange Commission. We would recognize “that the courts, while
retaining the final authority to expound the statute, should avail themselves of the aid implicit
in the agency's superiority in gathering the relevant facts and in marshaling them into a meaningful pattern.”
Id. (quoting Fed. Mar. Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 498 (1958)) (internal citations
omitted).
98. The regulatory scheme under administrative law saw a sharp increase in the 1960s
and 1970s with the passage of a number of acts which created or modified administrative
agencies. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1965) (Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-31 (1990) (Environmental Protection Agency); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§
651-78 (2004) (Occupational Safety and Health Administration); Consumer Product Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-89 (2011) (Consumer Product Safety Commission); Department of
Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7134 (1977) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission);
See also 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 11 (3d ed. 2017).
99. See Bradley W. Pratt, The Pathway to Primary Jurisdiction, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG.
(Aug. 10, 2015), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/products/articles/summer2015-0815-pathway-primary-jurisdiction.html [https://perma.cc/7MJU-UC4R].
100. See Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 2015).
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purposes.101 Application of the doctrine is thus reserved for issues germane
to the litigation and important enough to warrant involving a federal
agency.102
E.

The Path: Testing Whether and How to Apply the Doctrine

There is a lack of uniformity amongst courts in the “tests” or factors
used to decide whether the doctrine should apply. For example, the Ninth
Circuit has a four-step test, stating that the doctrine should apply where there
is, “(1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by Congress
within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory authority
(3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory authority that (4) requires expertise or uniformity in administration.”103 The Second and Third Circuits consider four factors:
1) whether the question at issue is within the conventional
experience of judges or whether it involves technical or policy considerations within the agency's particular field of expertise; 2) whether the question at issue is particularly within
the agency's discretion; 3) whether there exists a substantial
danger of inconsistent rulings; and 4) whether a prior application to the agency has been made.104
Although these factors or tests may prove helpful in aiding a court’s analysis
of whether the doctrine should apply, the Western Pacific decision cautions
against such a formulaic approach.105 Courts should ask only whether the

101. See Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
doctrine is not designed to ‘secure expert advice’ from agencies ‘every time a court is presented with an issue conceivably within the agency’s ambit.’”) (quoting Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., 277 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002)).
102. See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 810 F.3d 299 (5th Cir.
2016) (discussing how invoking the doctrine is inappropriate “when the agency's position is
sufficiently clear or nontechnical or when the issue is peripheral to the main litigation, courts
should be very reluctant to refer [the matter].”) (quoting Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United
Gas Pipeline Co., 532 F.2d 412, 419 (5th Cir. 1976)); see also MCI Worldcom, 277 F.3d at
1172 (“Primary jurisdiction is properly invoked when a claim is cognizable in federal court
but requires resolution of an issue of first impression, or of a particularly complicated issue
that Congress has committed to a regulatory agency.”) (emphasis supplied).
103. Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech., Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir.
2002).
104. Baykeeper v. NL Indus., Inc., 660 F.3d 686, 691 (3d Cir. 2011); Nat’l Commc’ns
Ass’n Inc., v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Nat’l Commc’ns
Ass’n Inc., v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 813 F.Supp. 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
105. See United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956) (“No fixed formula
exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In every case the question is whether
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arguments in the pleadings can support application of the doctrine to promote
at least one of the doctrine’s three core purposes, and whether the referred
issue is important or complex enough to make referral prudent and sound.
If an issue is ready for referral, the last step a court must take is to choose
an appropriate referral method. The problem of referral, though, is that it
lacks precise definition and shape, a fact which critics of the doctrine cite as
a serious weakness.106 The Supreme Court said that referral is “loosely described as a process whereby a court refers an issue to an agency.”107 Some
agencies have established procedures for primary jurisdiction referrals, such
as the Surface Transportation Board108 and the Federal Communications
Commission.109 However, most other agencies have not.110 Still, courts have
successfully petitioned agencies in absence of clearly delineated referral procedures.111 But even when an agency is set up to receive referrals, or even
the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves will
be aided by its application in the particular litigation.”).
106. See Knippa, supra note 16, at 1305-06 (“Court decisions are, in fact, rife with
references to ‘referral’ under primary jurisdiction doctrine, which seems to imply either that
there is some mechanism through which a court can make such a referral or that each agency
is equipped with a procedure that explicitly permits such a referral. Surprisingly . . . there is
no such mechanism or procedure.”).
107. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 n.3 (1993).
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (2012) (part (b) describes how courts will retain jurisdiction
over the dispute in the event of referral, part (c) provides the timeline for a response, stating
“[a]ny action brought under subsection (b) of this section shall be filed within 90 days from
the date that the order of the Surface Transportation Board becomes final.”).
109. See Richard Welch, Demystifying Primary Jurisdiction Referrals, FED. COMMC’N
COMM’N (July 29, 2010), https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2010/07/29/demystifyingprimary-jurisdiction-referrals [https://perma.cc/Y6FA-VMJR] (“In the communications law
context, a primary jurisdiction referral typically occurs when private litigants raise an issue in
court (most often a federal district court) that involves a contested interpretation of the Communications Act, the FCC’s rules, or an FCC order – in other words, a dispute over an issue
that the Commission has the congressionally delegated authority to resolve.”).
110. See Reiter, 507 U.S. at 268 n. 3 ("But the ICA (like most statutes) contains no
mechanism whereby a court can on its own authority demand or request a determination from
the agency; that is left to the adversary system. . . .”).
111. Three district courts petitioned the FDA to respond to an issue in three different,
but related, cases. See Barnes v. Campbell’s Soup Co., 12-cv-05185 JSW, 2013 WL 5530017
at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (“Accordingly, and out of respect for the FDA’s authority, the
Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant’s Natural Vegetable Soups on the grounds of primary jurisdiction and REFERS the matter to the
FDA for an administrative determination, and STAYS the action for a period of six months
from the date of this Order.”); In Re General Mills, Inc. Kix Cereal Litig., 12-cv-00249-KMMCA, 2013 WL 5943972 at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2013) (“Pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.225(c),
this Court hereby refers to the FDA for an administrative determination the question of under
what circumstances food products containing ingredients produced using bioengineered corn
may be labeled ‘All Natural.’”). The FDA responded to all three petitions in a single letter.
See Letter from Leslie Kux, Assistant Comm’r for Policy, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Hon.
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, N.D. Cal., Hon. Jeffrey S. White, N.D. Cal., & Hon. Kevin
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receptive to the idea of doing so, the immediate effect of applying the primary
jurisdiction doctrine is a delay.112
The potential for indefinite delay is a true problem, one which prevents
some courts from applying the doctrine,113 and something that critics of the
referral process of the primary jurisdiction doctrine find most troublesome.114
The Fifth Circuit illustrated the concern, saying:
[C]ourts should be reluctant to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which often, but not always, results in
added expense and delay to the litigants where the nature of
the action deems the application of the doctrine inappropriate. . . . Likewise, when the agency's position is sufficiently
clear or nontechnical or when the issue is peripheral to the
main litigation, courts should be very reluctant to refer. . . .
Finally, the court must always balance the benefits of seeking the agency's aid with the need to resolve disputes fairly
yet as expeditiously as possible.115
But given the discretionary nature of the doctrine, even the menace of delay
is not without a solution.
A court can mitigate the negative effects of the inherent delay involved
with applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine by limiting the length of the
stay.116 A court may also petition the agency directly by addressing a question
to the agency,117 or, if a court believes it “need[s] specific information . . . to
decide [its] case,” it may request that the agency submit an amicus brief.118
McNulty, D.N.J., dated Jan. 6, 2014 at 3. The petitions and letters are discussed in further
detail, infra.
112. See Knippa, supra note 16, at 1307.
113. See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 810 F.3d 299, 309-10
(5th Cir. 2016) (“Thus, at a general level, the primary jurisdiction doctrine requires the district
court to balance the assistance potentially provided by an agency’s specialized expertise
against the litigants’ certainty of delay.”).
114. See, e.g., Winters, supra note 24, at 255-57; Knippa, supra note 16, at 1307.
115. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 532 F.2d 412, 419 (5th
Cir. 1976).
116. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 256 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”).
117. See, e.g., Cox v. Gruma Corp., 12-CV-6502 YGR, 2013 WL 3828800 at *2 (N.D.
Cal. July 11, 2013) (The court initiated its own administrative proceeding with the FDA pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(c) asking “whether and under what circumstances food products
containing ingredients produced using bioengineered seed may or may not be labeled ‘Natural’ or ‘All Natural’ or ‘100% Natural’”).
118. Ryan v. Chemlawn Corp., 935 F.2d 129, 132 (7th Cir. 1991) (In reversing the
district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim without prejudice pursuant to a primary jurisdiction referral to the EPA, the court added, “If the district court believed that it needed
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If an agency does not respond, or expresses no interest in addressing the issue, the court can proceed to hear the matter.119
PART II – OPIOIDS
Although courts should consider the wisdom of consulting an agency to
promote the doctrine’s three core purposes of uniformity, utilizing agency
expertise, and proper allocation of responsibility, in practice, consulting an
agency for its expertise resonates the loudest in contemporary jurisprudence.120 Indeed, courts have placed heavy emphasis on this core component
of the doctrine’s original expression;121 applying the doctrine in a wide variety of cases where complicated factual issues necessitate consulting a regulatory body for its expertise.122 However, many courts find referral is
specific information from the EPA to decide this case, it could have asked the EPA to file an
amicus brief.”).
119. See Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Common sense tells us that even when agency expertise would be helpful, a court should not invoke
primary jurisdiction when the agency is aware of but has expressed no interest in the subject
matter of the litigation.”); see also Bradley W. Pratt, The Pathway to Primary Jurisdiction,
A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (Aug. 10, 2015), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/products/articles/summer2015-0815-pathway-primary-jurisdiction.html (“[I]n practice, courts are
reluctant to apply the doctrine without some express agency interest in the issue at stake.”).
120. Leib v. Rex Energy Operating Corp., No. 06–cv–802–JPG–CJP, 2008 WL
5377792, at *14 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2008) (quoting In re StarNet, Inc., 355 F.3d 634, 639 (7th
Cir. 2004)) (“The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows a federal court to refer a matter extending beyond the ‘conventional experiences of judges' or ‘falling within the realm of administrative discretion’ to an administrative agency with more specialized experience, expertise,
and insight.”).
121. See, e.g., Biffar v. Pinnacle Foods Grp., LLC, No. 16-0873-DRH, 2016 WL
7264973, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2016); King v. Time Warner Cable, 113 F. Supp. 3d 718,
723-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (appeal pending, No. 15-2474 (filed Aug. 6, 2015)); Chemlawn, 935
F.2d at 131 (drawing upon Western Pacific, stating the purpose of the primary jurisdiction
doctrine is “to resolve the complexities of certain areas outside the conventional experience
of the courts” and to promote judicial economy by allocating responsibility over a matter to
an agency for final determination).
122. Stevens v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 152 F. Supp. 3d 527, 535-37 (S.D. W. Va., 2016)
(“The FDA is in the best position to determine whether Boston Scientific's mesh device is in
compliance with the FDA's own statutes, regulations, and directives—particularly because the
FDA was the very agency that cleared Boston Scientific's mesh device in the first place.”);
SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (copyright
royalty board); Splitrock Props., Inc. v. Qwest Commc’ns Corp., No. 08-412-KES, 2010 WL
2867126, at *1, *6 (D.S.D. July 20, 2010) (“[A]pplication of Splitrock's switched access tariff
requires interpretation of words used in a technical sense and consideration of extrinsic evidence relating to topics within the expertise of the FCC.”); Langtston ex rel. Langston v. Iroquois Cent. Sch. Dist., 736 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (holding that referral of
a matter requesting the annulment of the suspension of a high school student to the Commissioner of Education was appropriate given the Commissioner possessed “the specialized
knowledge and experience” required to address the issue); Audiotext Int’l, Ltd. v. MCI
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appropriate only for issues of first impression, or complicated issues falling
within an agency’s congressional mandate.123 While restricting the use of the
doctrine only to novel or thorny issues requiring agency expertise seems sensible, both in the context of limited agency resources124 and of the preservation of judicial autonomy,125 the effect of such a course of action overlooks
the important goals of uniformity and promotion of a working relationship
between court and agency.
If the primary jurisdiction doctrine is to remain a viable judicial tool,
courts must begin to recognize each of the doctrine’s core purposes and,
where sufficient reason exists, courts must begin to invoke the doctrine so
these purposes may be put into action. The massive opioid addiction problem
currently sweeping the United States serves as an excellent backdrop to illustrate this principle. The problem involves the regulatory authority of administrative bodies, important and complex scientific, social, and economic
questions, and contentious litigation. In this part, I will lay out a brief history
of opioids, discuss the Food and Drug Administration and its role in regulating prescription drugs, and discuss the parens patriae suits brought against
opioid manufacturers and distributors.
A.

The Background of the Opioid Epidemic

Opioids are a class of narcotics, either natural, semi-synthetic, or fully
synthetic, which deliver effects ranging from analgesic to euphoric when processed by the brain.126 The oldest opioids are the natural opioid products
WorldCom Commc’ns, Inc., No. CIV.A. 00-3982, 2001 WL 1580316, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
11, 2001).
123. See Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., 277 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.
2002).
124. See Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of Food, 58 Fed. Reg. at 2407 (lack of agency resources to address “natural”
claims).
125. See Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding that the FDA need not be consulted regarding straightforward claims of violation of
FDA regulations, noting that courts are “well-equipped” to answer such questions).
126. Opioids, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MOLECULAR PHARMACOLOGY 903 (Stefan Offermanns & Walter Rosenthal, eds., 2008). The words used to describe this class of narcotics can
include “opiates” or “opioids.” In the past, “opiates” was used to refer almost exclusively to
naturally derived products, while “opioids” was used to refer to semi-synthetic or synthetic
products which operate in a manner substantially like natural products. Today, the colloquial
word “opioid” generally refers to both natural and synthetic analgesics targeting opiate receptors in the human brain, discussed infra. For the purposes of this Note, the term “opioid” or
“opioids” will adopt the colloquial definition, unless otherwise specified. For more information, see generally Opium Derivatives, Opium.com http://www.opium.com/derivatives/
(last accessed Mar. 16, 2017).
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which derive from the milk of the opium poppy plant and include commonly
known drugs such as morphine and codeine.127 More recent pharmacological
developments yield a variety of synthetic and semi-synthetic medicines and
substances and include the illicit drug heroin as well as mass produced pharmaceuticals like fentanyl, methadone, and OxyContin.128 Opioids have long
been known for their therapeutic properties129 and their widespread use in the
therapeutic treatment of pain, depression, and other ailments in the United
States began in the mid 19th century.130 Later scientific studies examining
the operation of opioids on neurological functions confirmed what 19th and
early 20th century physicians understood by observation.131
Opioids contain a chemical agent that mimics the action of endorphins.132 Once the chemical agent enters the bloodstream it travels to the
brain where it attaches to opiate sensitive receptors, artificially triggering the
brain’s reward center.133 The triggering process causes the release of dopamine, creating feelings of intense pleasure which may be strong enough to
overcome and relieve significant pain.134 However, opioid use absent severe
pain results in a singularly euphoric sensation, and triggering the brain’s reward center in such a manner leads many users to diversion, tolerance, and,
ultimately dependence and addiction.135

127. See Michael J. Brownstein, Review, A Brief History of Opiates, Opioid Peptides,
and Opioid Receptors, 90 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5391-93 (1993); Opiates, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF MOLECULAR PHARMACOLOGY 903 (Stefan Offermanns & Walter Rosenthal, eds., 2008).
128. See, e.g., How Drugs are Developed and Approved, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/default.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2017); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
APPROVAL PACKAGE FOR NDA 20-195/S-002 (1996) (fentanyl oralet).
129. Evidence of opiate use in analgesic applications dates back thousands of years.
Mention of its use is found in the writings of Homer, ancient Egypt, the Middle East, China,
and middle age England. For an excellent summary of opium’s use throughout history, see
MARTIN BOOTH, OPIUM: A HISTORY, 15-34 (1996).
130. Most opiate users in the mid to late 19th century were women. Doctors often
prescribed opiates to treat “female hysteria.” See E. Leong Way, History of Opiate Use in the
Orient and the United States, 398 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI., vol. 1, 1982, at 12-23; see also
Review, The Opium Treatment in Psychoses, 46 AM. J. INSANITY 287 (1888); DAVID T.
COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: A HISTORY OF OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA 8-15 (Harv.
Univ. Press 2001).
131. See AMER. ASS’N FOR THE STUDY AND CURE OF INEBRIETY, THE DISEASE OF
INEBRIETY FROM ALCOHOL, OPIUM, AND OTHER NARCOTIC DRUGS: ITS ETIOLOGY, PATHOLOGY,
TREATMENT, AND MEDICO-LEGAL RELATIONS 317-27 (1893).
132. Adam S. Sprouse-Blum, Understanding Endorphins and Their Importance in
Pain Management, 69 HAW. MED. J. 70, 70-71 (2010).
133. See Thomas R. Kosten & Tony P. George, The Neurobiology of Opioid Dependence: Implications for Treatment, 1 SCI. & PRAC. PERSPECTIVES, no. 1, 2002, at 13.
134. Id. at 13-14.
135. Id.
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Addiction to opioids—especially morphine—became increasingly troublesome in the closing decade of the 19th century and early years of the 20th
despite wide acknowledgment of opioids’ legitimate medicinal applications.136 Positive feelings about the efficacy of morphine faded in light of its
highly addictive quality, often causing morphine addiction to be equated with
alcoholism.137 Thus, spurred by both the Temperance Movement and emerging Progressive Era principles, the scientific community set to work developing new drugs that would retain the beneficial characteristics of morphine
while shedding its addictive qualities.138 In 1898, Germany-based Bayer
Pharmaceuticals began to claim its new wonder drug distilled from morphine
was just what the doctor ordered.139 Bayer asserted its new drug, Heroin, the
first semi-synthetic opioid, had all the benefits of morphine but none of the
unpleasant side effects like the tendency to encourage addiction.140 Heroin
soon hit the worldwide markets where it achieved rapid success thanks in no
small part to Bayer’s superior promotional efforts.141 The medical community lauded heroin’s effectiveness, echoing the claims in Bayer’s promotional
advertisements by triumphantly touting it as a miracle cure.142 However, the
136. The active ingredient in opium was distilled in 1806 creating the drug Morphine.
The invention of the hypodermic needle in the 1850s led to increased medicinal use in the
U.S., especially after the Civil War. See Michael J. Brownstein, Review, A Brief History of
Opiates, Opioid Peptides, and Opioid Receptors, 90 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5391-93 (1993).
Addiction to opioids was a grave concern in late Victorian America and in the early Progressive Era. For a summary of the extent of the opioid addiction problem in the late 19th and
early 20th century, see COURTWRIGHT, supra note 130, at 1-34.
137. The third wave of the Temperance Movement equated alcoholism to morphine
addiction. “There is no more reason in modern science for the beverage use of alcoholic liquor
than there is for the same use of opium, morphine, or cocaine. The appetite for liquor is abnormal, unscientific and inexcusable as is the appetite of the morphine fiend, and the user of
liquor ought to be as much ashamed of his habit as is the user of morphine.” E.O. Taylor,
Science and Legislation of the Alcohol Question, 19 SCI. TEMPERANCE J. 84, 85 (1910).
138. David F. Musto, A Brief History of American Drug Control, 6 ORG. AM.
HISTORIANS MAG. HIST., no. 2, 1991, at 12-13.
139. See RAYMOND COOPER & JEFFREY JOHN DEAKIN, BOTANICAL MIRACLES:
CHEMISTRY OF PLANTS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 137 (2016).
140. See id. Heroin was distilled from morphine in 1898 by Germany-based Bayer
Pharmaceuticals just two weeks after the same company synthesized the formula of aspirin.
Id.
141. See Musto, supra note 138, at 13-14. The very name of heroin was a marketing
tactic. Bayer chose the name “heroin,” derived from heroisch, the German word for heroic,
because of the way the drug made its users feel. Heroin was widely advertised as safe and
effective. It was made available in pastille, lozenge, powder, liquid, and other forms, and was
found in children’s cough syrups. See KENAZ FILAN, THE POWER OF THE POPPY: HARNESSING
NATURE’S MOST DANGEROUS PLANT ALLY 86 (2011).
142. See FILAN, supra note 141; see also James R. L. Daly, A Clinical Study of Heroin,
142 BOS. MED. & SURGICAL J. 190 (1900) (“It possesses many advantages over morphine . . .
it prolongs respiration . . . it is not a hypnotic; [there is an] absence of danger of requiring the
habit.”).
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drug proved to be just as addictive, and dangerous, as its precursors.143 The
medical community of the 1920s condemned heroin and believed “alkaloids
of opium” could achieve heroin’s beneficial effects and avoid its harms.144
Progressive era legislators squared up to face the heroin epidemic by
crafting several regulatory acts aimed toward stemming the tide of opioid
addiction and abuse.145 The first, the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, was
designed to make food and drugs safer by requiring strict label requirements
when potentially harmful ingredients, like heroin, were included in over-thecounter medicines.146 The second major law to address the opioid epidemic
was the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, a regulatory measure aimed at controlling the distribution of opioids and cocaine by imposing a special tax on
individuals in the supply chain.147 The production of heroin was banned entirely in 1924.148 Drugs containing opioids could still be sold, however, and
their safety and effectiveness were subject only to post-hoc review.149 The
143. See FILAN, supra note 141. Heroin eventually lost its favored position within the
medical community and is now considered to have no legitimate medicinal use whatsoever.
See Drug Scheduling, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., https://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ds.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) (“Schedule I drugs, substances, or chemicals are
defined as drugs with no currently accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse. Some
examples of Schedule I drugs are: heroin, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), marijuana (cannabis), 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (ecstasy), methaqualone, and peyote.”).
144. Prohibiting the Importation of Crude Opium for the Purpose of Manufacturing
Heroin: Hearing on H.R. 7079 Before H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 68th Cong. 32-34 (1924)
(statement of Stephen G. Porter, Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives) (Mr. Porter recited a letter he received from the New York City Department of Health,
one relevant portion of which states, “[h]eroin is not a necessity in either medicine or art. All
of its useful qualities can be easily and safely replaced by alkaloids of opium.”).
145. See Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (hereinafter
“Pure Food and Drugs Act”), repealed by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch.
675, §§1-902, 52 Stat 1040.
146. Congressional action in creating the act was probably spurred in part by a series
of withering exposés of over the counter medicine manufacturers who often included narcotics
such as heroin, opium, cocaine, and large amounts of caffeine in their products without notifying consumers. See SAMUEL HOPKINS ADAMS, THE GREAT AMERICAN FRAUD (5th ed. 1912)
(The contents in Hopkins’s book are reprints of articles he wrote for Collier’s Weekly, published from 1905-1906).
147. See Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785, repealed
by Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971
(2006). One point of significance is the fact that Bayer removed heroin from the open market
in 1913 after discovering its addictive properties were even more potent than morphine.
Bayer’s removal coincided with the passage of the Harrison Act just a year later. See FILAN,
supra note 141.
148. An Act Prohibiting the Importation of Crude Opium for the Purpose of Manufacturing Heroin, Pub. L. 68-274, 43 Stat. 657, repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 171-74 (2006).
149. Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo
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Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 overhauled the Pure Food
and Drugs Act, providing, for the first time, that drugs had to be proven safe
before they could be sold.150 The agency responsible for making safety determinations is the Food and Drug Administration.151
B.

The FDA and its Regulatory Role

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the federal administrative
body responsible for regulating the safety, effectiveness, marketing, and advertisement of prescription drugs.152 The FDA engages in a variety of direct
enforcement activities to achieve its regulatory goals, for example, involuntary recalls of unsafe drugs,153 seizure of products,154 and warning letters issued to prescription drug manufacturers whose advertisements are false or
misleading.155
The FDA’s involvement in regulating prescription drugs increased over
time as the need for government regulation in this area became apparent.156
/History/CentennialofFDA/CentennialEditionofFDAConsumer/ucm093787.htm (last visited
Sept. 16, 2017).
150. Id.
151. See History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 29, 2017),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/. The regulatory structure of the FDA
drew from the framework provided in the Pure Food and Drugs Act. Id.
152. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2016); see also What Does FDA Do?, U.S. FOOD AND
DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194877.htm (“FDA is responsible for [p]rotecting the public health by assuring that
foods . . . are safe, wholesome, sanitary and properly labeled; ensuring that human and veterinary drugs, and vaccines and other biological products and medical devices intended for human use are safe and effective.”).
153. See, e.g., United States v. K-N Enters., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 988, 990-91 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (holding that courts can use their equitable powers to “restrain violations of section 331”
of the Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act, including the issuance of injunctions, pursuant to
section 332(a); granting government’s motion for injunction to recall drugs containing Renacidin and Neomycin).
154. 21 U.S.C. § 334 (2012).
155. See, e.g., Warning Letter from Koung Lee, Reg. Review Officer, Div. of Advert.
& Promotion Review, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Todd D. McIntyre, Vice President, Reg.
Affairs, DURECT Corp., at 4-5 (Sept. 8, 2016) (requesting that the pharmaceutical manufacturer take corrective action to remedy misleading advertisement of its investigational new
drug, Remoxy, an extended release opioid analgesic); see also 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(i)
(2018) (prescription drug advertisements).
156. Central to the advertising provisions within the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
are the requirements that advertisements of prescription drugs should not be false or misleading—the issue of true statements regarding prescription drug prices was central to the argument in protecting commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, where the Court recognized that listeners, arguably, especially those of limited
economic means, could find great value in the free flow of such commercial speech. See 21
U.S.C.A. §§ 352(n)-360n-1 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90); Va. State Bd. of
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The Federal Trade Commission regulated prescription drug advertisements
from the onset of the 1938 Act until 1962, when amendments to the act
granted the FDA regulatory control over prescription drug advertising.157
Placing the authority to regulate prescription drug advertisement with the
FDA was the logical outgrowth of the FDA’s existing regulatory responsibilities; it seems only natural that the agency possessing the necessary expertise to determine the safety and efficacy of prescription drugs would be the
better choice to regulate prescription drug advertisements. This shift of advertising oversight, and other authority granted in the 1962 amendments,
such as new drug approval standards, broadened and strengthened the FDA’s
administrative powers.158
The contemporary incarnation of the FDA is at once a gatekeeper and a
fence-mender, applying rigorous standards to protect the public from injury
and formulating regulations and policy objectives to mend damage not
avoided.159 In 2011, the FDA’s Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 753 (1976); see also JAMES
T. O’REILLY & KATHERINE A. VAN TASSEL, 1 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION Introduction
§ 1.3, Westlaw (4th ed. database updated Nov. 2016) (“A theme frequently repeated is that
consumers cannot adequately protect themselves against products resulting from new technology in the food industry, the pharmaceutical and over-the-counter drug field, and the cosmetics industry. Consumers of the goods produced by these massive industries should be able to
rely, in most cases, on the manufacturer to assure that the products will provide the benefits
claimed with no adverse effects. However, the unknowable, latent dangers from this class of
products have been with us since ancient times. Regulation, though costly and imperfect, is
the price society pays to avoid that dilemma.”).
157. An amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act granted the FTC the authority to regulate the advertisement of drugs, see Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 55(a)), but the authority to regulate prescription drugs was vested
with the FDA with the passage of the Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 131,
76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2016)).
158. 1962 was a watershed year for the FDA. See, generally, Note, Drug Efficacy and
the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 Geo. L. J. 185 (1971) (discussing the significance of the
changes enacted by the 1962 amendments).
159. The gatekeeping function of the FDA is acknowledged because of its pre-approval review requirement for drugs and medical devices. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw
Liab. Litig., 159 F. 3d 817, 828 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he FDA is a gatekeeper charged with the
responsibility of protecting the public from unreasonable risks of injury from medical devices.”), rev’d on other grounds, 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Mitchell Russell Stern, Note, An Adverse Reaction: FDA Regulation of Generic Drug Labeling, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2154, 2163
(2015) (“In the context of pharmaceuticals, the FDA functions not only as a regulator, but also
as a gatekeeper. Each and every new drug must be approved by the FDA before the drug’s
manufacturer can introduce it into the U.S. market.”). The FDA acknowledges that regulatory
and policy changes have become necessary in the wake of the opioid crisis sweeping the nation. See FDA Opioids Action Plan, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FactSheets/ucm484714.htm
[https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20170723153345/https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FactSheets/ucm484714.htm].
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Communications was reorganized into the Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP) with two separate divisions: the Division of Direct to Consumer Promotion (DDTCP) and Division of Professional Promotion
(DPP).160 The primary functions of the DDTCP are to provide advisory review of consumer promotional materials so that marketers of pharmaceuticals and medical devices will avoid violating advertising requirements, and
to “[d]evelop[] and issue[] enforcement actions against false and misleading
DTCP materials and activities for prescription drugs.”161 The functions of the
DPP are largely the same as those of the DDTCP, but its regulatory actions
are focused on advertisements directed towards medical professionals.162
Another function of the FDA is to receive and answer citizen petitions
requesting that the FDA “issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order, or
take or refrain from taking any other form of administrative action.”163 Although in recent years citizen petitions have come primarily from pharmaceutical companies seeking to prevent each other’s products from entering the
market,164 some petitions do come from members of the general public.165
Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing (PROP)—an organization
outside the pharmaceutical or medical device industry—petitioned the FDA
to reevaluate its stance on the long-term use of prescription of opioid analgesics by limiting their use to a “maximum duration of 90-days for continuous
(daily) use for non-cancer pain.”166 In its response letter, the FDA found the
studies and evidence presented by PROP lacked sufficient data and scientific
merit to support their request and, thus, expressly refused find opioid use
beyond ninety days to be unsafe.167 This citizen petition and the FDA’s response are part of a wider discussion about the opioid epidemic in the United
States, and both letters played a critical role in the argument for application

160. See Statement of Organizations, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 76 Fed.
Reg. 59,408 (Sept. 26, 2011) [hereinafter OPDP Statement of Organization].
161. Id. at 59,409.
162. See id.
163. Initiation of Administrative Proceedings, 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(a) (2016); see also
Citizen Petition, 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2016).
164. See Brian K. Chen et al., Petitioning the FDA to Improve Pharmaceutical, Device
and Public Health Safety by Ordinary Citizens: A Descriptive Analysis, PLOS ONE, May 12,
2016,
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0155259&type=printable.
165. Chen estimates that only 18% of citizen petitions to the FDA between 2001 and
2013 came from individuals or organizations who were not pharmaceutical or medical device
manufacturers. See id. at 1.
166. See Letter from Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing to U.S. Food &
Drug Admin. at 2 (July 25, 2012) [hereinafter PROP Pet.].
167. See Response to PROP Pet. from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. at 1, 14-17 (Sept. 10, 2013) [hereinafter FDA Response] (denying
PROP Pet. for a 90-day non-cancer maximum).
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of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the California and Chicago cases, discussed infra.
A.

What Happened with Purdue Pharma and OxyContin

Understanding what led California, Chicago, and all the other parens
patriae plaintiffs to file suit against opioid manufacturers requires a brief discussion of OxyContin, the drug that some believe started the epidemic.168
OxyContin is a controlled release opioid analgesic produced, marketed, and
sold since 1996 by Purdue Pharma, a privately owned and operated pharmaceutical developer and manufacturer based in Stamford, Connecticut.169 OxyContin was developed to address treatment concerns regarding oxycodone,
another opioid analgesic, for longer-term treatment of moderate to severe
pain.170 Oxycodone is an opioid analgesic that has been used in a clinical
setting since 1917.171 Oxycodone derives from thebaine, an extremely toxic
extract of the Iranian poppy, papaver brachtetum.172 Iranian poppies contain
no morphine, unlike their cousins, traditional Opium poppies, papaver somniferum, but the oxycodone synthesized from thebaine is free from thebaine’s
toxic poison and is similar in both structure and function to morphine, but is
twice as potent.173
Oxycodone has been used in the United States since the 1930s for the
relief of pain and is commonly mixed with other substances, including aspirin
or Tylenol.174 Prescription oxycodone is an effective pain reliever, but its

168. See Mike Mariani, How the American Opiate Epidemic was Started by One Pharmaceutical Company, THE WEEK (Mar. 4, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/541564/howamerican-opiate-epidemic-started-by-pharmaceutical-company (attributing the current opioid
epidemic entirely to the actions of Purdue Pharma).
169. See Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 221-23 (2009); Locations and
Operations, PURDUEPHARMA.COM, http://www.purduepharma.com/about/locations-operations/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
170. OxyContin was designed to increase the length of time between doses of traditional Oxycodone. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Approval Package for NDA 20-553/S-002
(1996) (Medical officer review of OxyContin 80).
171. Eija Kalso, Oxycodone, 29 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. S47, S47-48 (2005).
172. See id.
173. See id.; see also GARY W. MORROW, BIORGANIC SYNTHESIS: AN INTRODUCTION
326, 326 (Oxford Univ. Press 2016); S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04110, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OXYCONTIN ABUSE AND DIVERSION AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE
PROBLEM, at 2, 9 (2003) (hereinafter “GAO Report”).
174. See Kalso, supra note 171; see also Common Errors in the Media About OxyContin (Oxycodone HCL Extended-Release Tablets) CII, PURDUEPHARMA.COM, http://www.purduepharma.com/news-media/common-errors-in-the-media-about-oxycontin-oxycodone-hclextended-release-tablets-cii/[https://perma.cc/B64B-6KGG]; GAO Report at 8 (“The active
ingredient in OxyContin tablets is oxycodone, a compound that is similar to morphine and is
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analgesic affect typically lasts only around four hours and requires frequent
doses to maintain relief.175 Purdue’s OxyContin was meant to increase the
amount of time between each dose of pain reliever, designed with the specific
purpose of delivering a continuous, controlled dose of oxycodone for up to
twelve hours.176 As such, to ensure longer periods of time between doses,
each tablet of OxyContin necessarily contains larger amounts of oxycodone
than traditional instant release oxycodone products.177 Purdue and the FDA
were both well aware that the active ingredient in OxyContin possessed the
addictive properties inherent in all opioids, and that OxyContin had the potential for abuse and misuse.178 However, both the FDA and Purdue believed
that OxyContin’s controlled release properties would reduce the potential for
abuse as long as the tablets were ingested without prior manipulation.179 OxyContin’s label warned against such manipulation, cautioning that ingesting
crushed, broken, or chewed tablets would lead to “rapid release and absorption of a potentially fatal dose of oxycodone.”180 But the warnings did little
to deter illicit use, and, in fact, may have inadvertently instructed users on
how to get high; addicts quickly learned how to achieve an intense high by
doing exactly what the label instructed against - crushing the pills to either
snort or inject the powder.181
Purdue Pharma was not the only pharmaceutical manufacturer distributing opioid products containing oxycodone, but Purdue’s OxyContin stood
also found in oxycodone-combination pain relief drugs such as Percocet, Percodan, and Tylox.”).
175. See Harriet Ryan, Lisa Girion & Scott Glover, ‘You Want a Description of Hell?’
OxyContin’s 12-Hour Problem, L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/projects/oxycontin-part1/ [ https://perma.cc/N78F-6KND].
176. See id.; GAO Report, supra note 173, at 8.
177. GAO Report, supra note 173, at 8 (“Because of its controlled release property,
OxyContin contains more active ingredient and needs to be taken less often.”).
178. GAO Report, supra note 173, at 8-10.
179. GAO Report, supra note 173, at 9 (“The OxyContin label originally approved by
the FDA indicated that the controlled-release characteristics of OxyContin were believed to
reduce its potential for abuse. The labels also contained a warning that OxyContin tablets were
to be swallowed whole.”); Letter from Robert F. Bedford, Ctr. for Drug Eval. & Research,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 12, 1995) (FDA original approval of OxyContin, NDA 20553) (on file with author).
180. See GAO Report, supra note 173, at 9.
181. See OxyContin: Its Use and Abuse: Hearing Before H. Sub. Comm. on Oversight
and Investigation, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 8 (2001) (prepared statement of Terrance W. Woodworth, Deputy Director, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration) (“The appeal of OxyContin' for abusers of controlled substances is
related to the larger amounts of active ingredient, oxycodone, in relation to other narcotic
products, and to the ability of abusers to easily compromise the controlled release formulation.
Simply crushing the tablet can negate the controlled release effect of the drug, enabling abusers to swallow or snort the drug for a powerful morphine-like high. The tablet can also be
crushed, mixed with water and injected.”).
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as a central figure in the wave of opioid addiction and in the surrounding
discussion.182 The rapid spread of opioid abuse garnered the attention of local, state, and federal government officials in the early years of the epidemic.183 Indeed, in addition to attention from the media and members of
Congress, by 2001, the FDA recognized the problems presented by OxyContin, prompting it to contact Purdue about the agency’s concerns.184 The FDA
changed OxyContin’s label to include a “black box” warning of the dangers
of the product, the strongest warning label available for an FDA regulated
product.185 Despite enhanced warnings, sales of OxyContin continued to increase, largely due to Purdue’s “aggressive” marketing activities.186 By 2001,
when negative press and increased governmental and regulatory scrutiny began to plague Purdue, the product had earned the company over $2.8 billion
in revenue.187 OxyContin is estimated to have generated revenues in excess

182. See Mariani supra note 168; see also Jim Edwards, One Nation, on Vicodin: Narcotic Painkillers are Most-Used U.S. Drugs, CBS MONEYWATCH (Apr. 20, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/one-nation-on-vicodin-narcotic-painkillers-are-most-usedus-drugs/ [ https://perma.cc/6DNK-9PM6].
183. See, e.g., OxyContin: Balancing Risks and Benefits: Hearing before S. Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. (2002); OxyContin: Its Use and Abuse:
Hearing before H. Sub. Comm. on Oversight and Investigation, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001) (representatives from numerous governmental agencies testifying
before the committee regarding opioid abuse, specifically OxyContin, including the representatives from the City of Philadelphia police department, the Office of the Attorney General for
the State of Pennsylvania, and the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration); OxyContin:
Hearing before Sub. Comm. on Depts. Of Com., Justice, State, Judiciary, and Related Agencies, H. Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. (2001) (hearing testimony from numerous
government representatives discussing the harmful effects of opioids, including OxyContin,
Purdue Pharma’s aggressive OxyContin marketing campaign, including testimony from Asa
Hutchinson, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, local police personnel from
West Virginia and Kentucky, a prosecutor from Virginia, and an addiction specialist).
184. See BARRY MEIER, PAIN KILLER: A "WONDER" DRUG'S TRAIL OF ADDICTION AND
DEATH 130 (2003) (“FDA officials, alarmed by what they were reading or seeing in television
reports, contacted Purdue headquarters and in a teleconference with top company executives
expressed their concerns.”).
185. See GAO Report, supra note 173, at 34.
186. See Van Zee, supra note 169, at 221 (“The promotion and marketing of OxyContin occurred during a recent trend in the liberalization of the use of opioids in the treatment of
pain, particularly for chronic non–cancer-related pain. Purdue pursued an ‘aggressive’ campaign to promote the use of opioids in general and OxyContin in particular. In 2001 alone, the
company spent $200 million in an array of approaches to market and promote OxyContin.”);
GAO Report, supra note 173, at 2 (“The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has expressed concern that Purdue’s aggressive marketing of OxyContin focused on promoting the
drug to treat a wide range of conditions to physicians who may not have been adequately
trained in pain management.”).
187. Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES
(May 10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html (“Between
1995 and 2001, OxyContin brought in $2.8 billion in revenue for Purdue Pharma, a closely
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of $30 billion since its entry onto the market and has been hailed as “America’s bestselling painkiller.”188
B.

Parens Patriae Suits

Individual product liability lawsuits and domestic class actions against
Purdue and other opioid makers began to surface in the early 2000s as the
rate of death from opioids increased, but these lawsuits met with little success, ending primarily in the pleading stage.189 Conversely, a number of governmental bodies have achieved tangible results in the form of cash settlements by bringing parens patriae suits against Purdue, including the State of
West Virginia, twenty-six states participating in a class action in conjunction
with Purdue’s 2007 criminal prosecution, and the State of Kentucky.190 In
May of 2007, Purdue and three of its top executives, appearing as individuals,
pled guilty to criminal charges of “misbranding” OxyContin by misrepresenting and concealing from regulators, prescribers, and patients the truth
about the drug’s operation, effects, and potential for abuse.191 A consequence
of the guilty pleas was a $600 million aggregate settlement, including the
forfeiture of millions of dollars and payment of funds to settle the civil cases
with twenty-six states.192 The Kentucky case was filed shortly after Purdue’s
guilty plea in October of 2007.193 A wave of litigation against Purdue and

held company based in Stamford, Conn. At one point, the drug accounted for 90 percent of
the company’s sales.”) [https://perma.cc/2V5K-YY4N].
188. Harriet Ryan, Lisa Girion & Scott Glover, ‘You Want a Description of Hell?’
OxyContin’s 12-Hour Problem, L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/projects/oxycontin-part1/. [ https://perma.cc/N78F-6KND].
189. For an excellent summary of cases filed and analysis of defenses and outcomes
for lawsuits regarding OxyContin, see Ausness, supra note 30, at 1122-46.
190. See West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 01-C-137S (W.
Va. Cir. Ct. June 11, 2001); Kentucky v. Purdue Pharma LP, No. 07-CI-01303 (Ky. Oct. 4,
2007); District of Columbia v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 2007 CA 003186 (D.D.C. May 8, 2007).
The West Virginia case was ultimately settled for $10 million in 2004. See Landon Thomas,
Maker of OxyContin Reaches Settlement with West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/06/business/maker-of-oxycontin-reaches-settlement-withwest-virginia.html [https://perma.cc/7P9L-CSGJ]. The Kentucky case was settled in 2015 for
$24 million. See Press Release, AG Conway Announces Two Pharmaceutical Settlements Totaling $39.5 Million, KENTUCKY.GOV (Dec. 23, 2015), http://kentucky.gov/Pages/Activitystream.aspx?n=AttorneyGeneralJackConway&prId=6 [https://perma.cc/E4X4-H9DH].
191. See Meier, supra note 187; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY JOHN BROWNLEE ON THE GUILTY PLEA OF THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY AND
ITS EXECUTIVES FOR ILLEGALLY MISBRANDING OXYCONTIN at 5-6, 9 (May 10, 2007) [hereinafter Brownlee Statement].
192. See Brownlee Statement, supra note 191 at 10.
193. See id. (“The settlement resolves allegations that Purdue Pharma illegally misrepresented and/or concealed the highly addictive nature of OxyContin and encouraged doctors
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other opioid manufacturers began seven years later in 2014 after the State of
Mississippi,194 the Counties of Orange and Santa Clara, California, and the
City of Chicago, Illinois brought suit.195 As of this writing, dozens of lawsuits
have been filed against opioid manufacturers or distributors by state, county,
and local governments.196
The California and Chicago complaints were filed within weeks of each
other with the assistance of the same outside counsel and largely contain parallel arguments.197 The thrust of the allegations is designed to support claims
who weren’t trained in pain management to overprescribe the opioid pain reliever to Kentucky
patients.”).
194. See Mississippi v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 25CH1:15-cv-001814 (Miss. Dec.
15, 2015) [hereinafter Miss. v. Purdue]. The manufacturer defendants in the Mississippi case
put forward several motions to stay or dismiss, including asking for dismissal for improper
venue and another motion asking to dismiss pursuant to primary jurisdiction. See Joint Motion
to Transfer Venue, Miss. v. Purdue (asking for venue transfer and dismissal for failure to state
a claim); Joint Motion to Dismiss, Miss. v. Purdue (asking for dismissal pursuant to primary
jurisdiction). The issue of primary jurisdiction was not reached because the case was placed
under an emergency stay pending the result of an interlocutory appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court on the denial of the motion to transfer venue. See Order of March 29, 2017, Miss.
v. Purdue.
195. See California v. Purdue, supra note 32; Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32. Purdue
objected to the California action on the basis that California was one of the twenty-six states
receiving monies following Purdue’s 2007 guilty plea. See Purdue Pharma Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32.
196. The list of pending parens patriae suits relating to the opioid epidemic grows by
the day and the cases are too numerous to list in a single footnote. However, the following list
of selected cases beyond Mississippi, California, and Chicago will illustrate the breadth of the
litigation concerning the safety and effectiveness of opioids. For examples of cases brought
by state attorneys general, see Missouri v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 1722-cc10626 (Mo. Cir.
Ct. June 21, 2017); New Hampshire v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:17-cv-00427 (Dist. N.H.
Aug. 8, 2017) (removed to federal court); New Mexico v. Purdue Pharma LP, No. D-101-CV201702451 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Sept. 7, 2017); Ohio v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CV 17 CI 000261
(Oh. Ct. Comm. Pleas May 31, 2017); Oklahoma v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816
(Ok. Dist. Ct. June 30, 2017); South Carolina v. Purdue Pharma, No. 2017-CP-400-4872 (S.C.
Ct. Comm. Pleas Aug. 15, 2017). For examples of cases brought by county municipal governments, see St. Clair Cty. Illinois v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 3:17-cv-00616 (S.D. Ill. June 9,
2017) (removed to federal court); Cty. of Broome v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 252/2017 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 19, 2017); Staubus v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. C41916 (Tn. Cir. Ct. June 13,
2017). For an example of a case brought by a local municipality, see City of Everett v. Purdue
Pharma, L.P., No. 17-2-00469-31 (Wa. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2017). Although not directly connected to Purdue Pharma, several counties within the State of West Virginia have brought
recent suits against wholesale opioid distribution companies, and others, for negligently
“flooding” the state with massive amounts of opioids. See Complaint, Cabell Cty. Comm’n v.
AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 3:17-cv-01665 (D. W.Va. Mar. 9, 2017).
197. In some instances, paragraphs and arguments within the complaints are identical.
For example, the first sentence of the introductory paragraph in each complaint states: “A
pharmaceutical manufacturer should never place its desire for profits above the health and
well-being of its customers.” First Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32,
at ¶1; Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 1.
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under state law deceptive acts and practices statutes, arguing that Purdue and
the other opioid defendants acted fraudulently by knowingly taking unfair
advantage of vulnerable populations and wrongfully influencing the prescribing practices of physicians.198 The allegations touch on sales techniques reminiscent of the kind of—aggressive marketing—that led to Purdue’s 2007
guilty plea. Purdue admitted in its plea that between December 1995 and June
2001 it trained and directed its salespeople to mislead healthcare providers
by portraying OxyContin as “less addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion, and less likely to cause tolerance and withdraw than other pain medications.”199 The California and Chicago cases make similar claims, alleging
again that the manufacturer defendants misrepresented their products.200
Both cases bear remarkable similarities and, at times, display word-forword identity in their pleadings.201 Both cases make allegations inseparably
linked to the regulatory authority of the FDA regarding a class of heavily
regulated products,202 yet the primary jurisdiction doctrine received different
treatment between the two cases. The California Court stayed the action, supporting its decision with rationale clearly adopting at least some of the values
of the primary jurisdiction doctrine,203 but the Chicago Court flatly rejected
the doctrine’s application.204 It is in this context, the disparity in treatment
and result between the California and Chicago cases, where the need for
courts to revise their view of the primary jurisdiction becomes most apparent.
PART III – RECONCILING DISCORDANT HOLDINGS
This part analyzes the holdings of the California and Chicago cases and
discusses how proper analysis under the primary jurisdiction doctrine would
198. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶
13; Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 7-8.
199. See United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 571 (W.D. Va.
2007).
200. Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 2, 39;
Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 3-4.
201. See, e.g., supra note 194. The commonality between the two cases is hardly unnoticeable. The two actions were brought by similar plaintiffs represented by the same counsel, against the same group of defendants, alleging virtually the same facts to support remarkably similar causes of action.
202. See generally Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32;
Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32.
203. Order of Aug. 27, 2015, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 2-3. The California court’s stay, on its own, demonstrates the need for courts to reexamine the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The California court issued its stay pursuant to its inherent authority to manage its own cases rather than officially staying the matter under the doctrine, even though the
rationale behind its decision clearly echoed principles of the doctrine.
204. Order of May 8, 2015, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32 (first denial); Order of
Sept. 29, 2016, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32 (second denial).
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have resulted in unity between the two actions. Before beginning the analysis, however, the criteria for applying the doctrine bear repeating. As discussed in Part I, above, different factors or tests are sometimes used by courts
to aid in their analysis of whether to apply the doctrine. Occam’s razor counsels a different approach.205 First, courts should examine the arguments in the
pleadings, whether explicit or implied, to decide whether application of the
doctrine will achieve any one of its core purposes: uniformity; proper utilization of agency expertise; or comity between court and agency. Next, courts
should consider whether prudence demands the important or complex issue
be referred. Finally, if a court decides to refer, the court should choose an
appropriate referral path.
A.

Pleadings: What are the Allegations?

Each complaint begins with an acerbic opening sentence.206 “A pharmaceutical manufacturer should never place its desire for profits above the
health and well-being of its customers.”207 The California complaint spends
over 130 pages on allegations of how Purdue engaged in fraud and deception
in marketing opioids for long-term non-cancer (“chronic”) pain even though
it knew opioids were “too addictive and too debilitating for long-term use.”208
The Chicago First Amended Complaint spends 191 pages making largely the
same kind of allegations, echoing, word for word, some of the allegations of
the California complaint.209 The Chicago Second Amended Complaint, although similar to the First Amended Complaint and the California complaint
in many respects, spends 326 pages alleging the fraudulent
205. The term “Occam’s razor” refers to the philosophical principle that the simplest
explanation or method should be sought first. Occam’s razor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Occam's razor (last accessed Mar. 25, 2017);
see also Samuel M. Bayard, Chihuahuas, Seventh Circuit Judges, and Movie Scripts, Oh My!:
Copyright Preemption of Contracts to Protect Ideas, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 628 n.175
(2001) (expounding upon the definition of the term with examples of its use by the courts).
206. See Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 1, 2526, 388-425.
207. The opening paragraph to the Chicago complaint is identical to the opening paragraph of the California complaint. Id. at ¶ 1; Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue,
supra note 32, at ¶ 1.
208. Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 2. The
complaint in this action has been amended three times and the current governing complaint is
the Fourth Amended Complaint, filed July 6, 2017. Because the order of stay relates to the
Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint, reference and discussion of the California allegations will be confined to that complaint.
209. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 3,
Chicago v. Purdue (“They knew—and had known for years—that, except as a last resort, opioids were too addictive and too debilitating for long-term use for chronic non-cancer pain
(pain lasting three months or longer, hereinafter referred to as ‘chronic pain’).”).
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misrepresentations.210 The most significant difference in the Chicago complaints is in their respective levels of detail; the Second Amended Complaint
pleads allegations with the painstaking particularity one might expect would
satisfy FRCP Rule 9, including detailed accounts of exactly what fraudulent
misrepresentations were made to specific medical professionals.211
The allegations in each of the relevant pleadings detail seven primary
types of fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the promotion of opioids
for the treatment of chronic pain: that opioids improve function; concealment
of the link between long-term use and addiction; misrepresentation that addiction risk can be managed; obfuscate discussion of addiction by coining the
term “pseudoaddiction;” falsely claiming withdrawal is easily managed; misrepresentation of the danger of high doses; and deceptive minimization of the
adverse effects of opioids and overstatement of the risks of NSAIDs.212 The
complaints allege these misrepresentations were carried out through indirect
sales activities, such as sponsoring unbranded marketing materials that promoted the use of opioids without discussing risks;213 the cultivation and subversive use of paid agents known as “key opinion leaders”214 and “front” organizations to deliver pre-approved, biased messages about opioids;215 and
direct-to-consumer marketing disguised as “education and support”
210. See generally Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32. As
in the California action, the Chicago complaint has been amended three times and the current
governing pleading is the Third Amended Complaint, filed October 25, 2016. The Chicago
action denied a motion to dismiss pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine in relation to
the First Amended Complaint, which was 191 pages, and the Second Amended Complaint,
cited here. Because the denials of the motions to dismiss reference and discuss the First and
Second Amended complaints, discussion of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in relation to the
allegations will be confined to those complaints.
211. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶
630(a) (describing an account of a specific Chicago prescriber, stating, “Purdue representatives have detailed him on OxyContin, Hysingla, and Butrans. About a year ago, these representatives pushed the message that “‘steady-state’ extended release drugs have less potential
for abuse.”). The detailed allegations of specific representations made to prescribers are found
in paragraphs 296 to 642 of the Chicago pleading. Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶
296-642; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 9 (heightened pleading required when alleging fraud).
212. Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 214; First
Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 244; Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 215-16 (this complaint adds one allegation of
misrepresentation against Purdue, singly, alleging it misrepresented “that OxyContin provides
a full twelve hours of pain relief.”).
213. Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 40; Second
Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 127. Unbranded marketing materials are not subject to review by the FDA.
214. Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 112; Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 134.
215. See Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 12325; Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 140.
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documents which targeted vulnerable populations, such as veterans and the
elderly.216
The manufacturer defendants argued the allegations touched on deeper,
more substantive questions about opioids beyond whether their companies
engaged in deceptive practices. The opening paragraph in each complaint alleges that the manufacturers knowingly and deceptively promoted their products, but the thrust of the allegations in each complaint, the manufacturers
argued, was that long-term opioid use is inherently unsafe.217 Their argument
had strong support.
The safety and efficacy of opioids for long-term use were a present
theme in both the California and Chicago complaints. Variations of the word
“safe” appeared on forty-four pages in the California complaint and on sixtytwo pages in the Chicago complaint.218 Both complaints implied that the opioids the manufacturer defendants marketed were unsafe in paragraph four,
using identical language: “Defendants also knew that controlled studies of
the safety and efficacy of opioids were limited to short-term use (not longer
than 90 days), and in managed settings (e.g., hospitals), where the risk of
addiction and other adverse outcomes was much less significant.”219 Both
complaints explicitly stated that opioids are unsafe for long-term use, using
identical language: “Defendants persuaded doctors and patients that what
they had long known—that opioids are addictive drugs, unsafe in most circumstances for long-term use—was untrue.”220 Both complaints imply that
opioids are not effective for long-term pain relief, using nearly identical language: “Despite the fact that opioids are routinely prescribed, there never has
been evidence of their efficacy for long-term use.”221 Both complaints allege
that the manufacturer defendants created or sponsored false research pointing
to the safety of opioids for long-term use.222 Both complaints charge, in their
216. Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶164-73,
California v. Purdue; Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶
205-13.
217. See Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 1-6;
First Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 1-9; Second Amended
Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 1-8.
218. See generally, Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32;
Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32.
219. Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 4; Second
Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 4.
220. Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 8; Second
Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 10.
221. Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 65. Paragraph 70 of the second amended Chicago complaint is almost identical. See Second Amended
Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 70.
222. Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 102, 118126; Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 150-56.
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first counts, that the manufacturer defendants misled consumers by misrepresenting the safety of opioids.223
The crux of the argument for dismissal or stay was that the FDA is the
expert body charged with deciding the safety of continuous, long-term use of
opioids, not courts or juries,224 and that, in fact, it had already decided.225
Plaintiffs in both actions opposed, responding that they were “not asking the
Court to resolve scientific issues” about the use of opioids for the treatment
of chronic pain and averred that the central issue in both cases was the truthfulness of the marketing representations about opioids, which courts are well
equipped to address.226 The manufacturer defendants moved to dismiss or
stay both actions pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.227 The California case was stayed in 2015 to allow the parties to pursue the matter before
the FDA and remains to this date under a partial stay.228 Motions to dismiss
or stay the First Amended and Second Amended Chicago complaints were
both denied.229
B.

Purposes: Do the Allegations Support One or More Doctrinal Purposes?

Uniformity in administration of law was the first doctrinal purpose of
the primary jurisdiction to be developed, discussed supra, but the manufacturer defendants and both courts focused their discussion primarily around

223. Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 391(m);
Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 742(g).
224. See supra note 32 at 1-2; supra note 33; Joint Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 1-2; Joint Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 1.
225. See Purdue Pharma Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 4-9; Joint Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, Chicago v.
Purdue, supra note 32, at 8, 11-12. The motions discuss at length the FDA’s response and
denial of a petition from Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing requesting that the
FDA limit prescriptions of opioids to a “maximum duration of 90-days for continuous (daily)
use for non-cancer pain.” See PROP Pet., supra note 166; FDA Response, supra note 167
(denying petition for a 90-day non-cancer maximum).
226. See Opposition to Demurrer, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶; Opposition to Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 5,
10.
227. Purdue Pharma Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue,
supra note 32, at 4-9; Joint Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue,
supra note 32, at 8, 11-12.
228. See Order of Aug. 27, 2015, California v. Purdue, supra note 32; see also Order
of Oct. 19, 2016, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 3 (lifting stay in part).
229. Order of May 8, 2015, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32 (first denial); Order of
Sept. 29, 2016, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32 (second denial).
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utilization of agency expertise.230 The discussion here will mirror that focus
and then expand to consider the other areas of the doctrine.
In the California case, the explicit statements in the complaint convinced Judge Robert J. Moss to stay the case to utilize the expertise of the
FDA. Judge Moss stated,
As the second amended complaint clearly shows, this case is
about determining what the public and doctors need to be
told about opioids. That determination necessary (sic) entails
much more than determining issues of false and misleading
marketing. Underlying every issue here, this case requires
this court to become an expert in the field in which it has no
expertise. It will have to determine which study, trial, etc. is
appropriate and correct as to each issue concerning the use
of opioids, and to what extent.231
Judge Jorge Alonso in the Northern District of Illinois found all the many
allegations in the Chicago complaint relating to the safety and efficacy of
opioids ancillary to what he saw as the actual issue in the case: misrepresentation.232 Despite that the issues of safety and efficacy appeared and reappeared throughout the complaint, Judge Alonso held the FDA’s expertise
would not be necessary.233 He said, “[t]he issue is not whether opioids are
prescribed appropriately but whether they are marketed truthfully; specifically, whether defendants misrepresented the risks, benefits and superiority
of opioids to treat long-term, chronic pain.”234 The second dismissal echoed
this holding.235
The disparity in the holdings regarding promoting proper utilization of
agency expertise is irreconcilable given the parties’ pleadings. One of the
FDA’s stated purposes is to ensure the safety and efficacy of prescription
drugs.236 The complaints do turn to a significant degree on the safety of opioids for long-term use, both by explicit allegations and by inference.237 If the
FDA were to decide that opioids were safe and effective for long-term use,
the force of each plaintiff’s argument would necessarily decrease, if not
230. Joint Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra
note 32, at 1-2; Joint Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue,
supra note 32, at 1.
231. Order of Aug. 27, 2015, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 2.
232. Order of May 8, 2015, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 7-10.
233. Id.
234. Order of May 8, 2015, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 8.
235. Order of Sept. 29, 2016, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 6-8.
236. See What Does FDA Do?, supra note 152.
237. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶
102, 118-126; Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 150-156.
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altogether disappear. Neither of the Chicago denials recognized the significance of the allegations of dangerousness or what it would mean for the case
if the FDA were to weigh in on the issue. The utility of requesting the FDA’s
expertise need not have controlled the decisions in the Chicago denials, but
it at least should have been acknowledged. A stay or dismissal to utilize
agency expertise could have been supported in both cases.
Both actions could have been stayed or dismissed under rationale supporting the need for uniformity in administration of laws. The Chicago holdings never analyzed this doctrinal purpose, but Judge Moss’s rationale in sustaining the Defendants’ demurrer and instituting a stay in the California action noted the need for uniformity.238 If the case were to continue, he reasoned, “[t]his action could lead to inconsistencies with the FDA’s findings,
inconsistencies among the States, a lack of uniformity, and a potential
chilling effect on the prescription of these drugs for those who need them
most.”239 Not only is this rationale supported by the fact that the FDA had
already at least partially addressed the issue of safety and efficacy of opioids
for long-term chronic pain,240 but also by the assumption that the California
court was most probably made aware of the parallel proceedings in Chicago
litigating largely the same issue, against the same defendants, by the assistance of common outside counsel. Support for the proposition that applying
the doctrine will promote the purpose of uniformity can also be found in examining how judicial determinations could run contrary to the FDA’s stated
objectives regarding its intent to regulate opioids, including those used in the
treatment of long-term, chronic pain.241 FDA representatives have made
statements to Congress, the press, and the public about its intent to regulate
opioids.242 One representative testified before a House Committee that the
“FDA recognizes the serious problem of prescription drug abuse. The
Agency will continue to take steps to curb abuse and misuse of prescription
drugs.”243
However, the strength of rationale supporting uniformity necessarily
fades if a court does not fully invoke the doctrine. Indeed, most, if not all, of
Judge Moss’s rationale in instituting the stay pulls directly from the principles supporting application of the doctrine, but he stayed the California action
238. Order of Aug. 27, 2015, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 3.
239. Id.
240. See FDA Response, supra note 167.
241. See, e.g., OxyContin: Its Use and Abuse: Hearing before H. Sub. Comm. on Oversight and Investigation, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001).
242. Id.
243. OxyContin and Beyond: Examining the Role of FDA and DEA in Regulating Prescription Painkillers: Hearing before H. Sub. Comm. on Regulatory Affairs, Comm. on Gov’t
Reform, 109th Cong. 23 (2005) (prepared statement of Robert J. Meyer, Dir., Of. of Drug
Evaluation II, FDA).
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pursuant to “the court’s inherent authority to manage its own cases,” not pursuant to the FDA’s primary jurisdiction.244 For this reason, Judge Alonso was
unpersuaded that his court should fall in line with the California Superior
Court in deciding the second motion to dismiss in the Chicago case.245 Notwithstanding the California Court’s decision to institute a stay pursuant to its
own power while using rationale supporting the primary jurisdiction doctrine,246 the arguments presented in the litigation and an assessment of the
surrounding factual context can support the doctrine’s purposes of promoting
uniformity in administration of laws.
Neither the California nor the Chicago court considered whether the
case should be referred to promote a proper working relationship between
courts and the FDA.247 Judge Moss in California stopped at agency expertise
and uniformity, and the Chicago court held twice that the FDA’s views on
the safety and efficacy of prescription opioids were wholly unnecessary.248
In the FDA’s own regulations, however, it considered its working relationship with courts in the context of primary jurisdiction.249
FDA has primary jurisdiction to make the initial determination on issues within its statutory mandate, and will request
a court to dismiss, or to hold in abeyance its determination
of or refer to the agency for administrative determination,
any issue which has not previously been determined by the
agency or which, if it has previously been determined, the
agency concluded should be reconsidered and subject to a
new administrative determination. The Commissioner may
utilize any of the procedures established in this part in reviewing and making a determination on any matter initiated
under this paragraph.250

244. Order of Aug. 27, 2015, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 2.
245. Order of Sept. 29, 2016, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 6-8 (stating the
Court was unpersuaded dismissal was warranted because of the California court’s decision to
stay pursuant to its own inherent power, and that the Court found no other facts had changed
which would warrant a stay under the primary jurisdiction doctrine).
246. Id.
247. See Order of Aug. 27, 2015, California v. Purdue, supra note 32; Order of May
8, 2015, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32; Order of Sept. 29, 2016, Chicago v. Purdue, supra
note 32.
248. See Order of Aug. 27, 2015, California v. Purdue, supra note 32; Order of May
8, 2015, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32; Order of Sept. 29, 2016, Chicago v. Purdue, supra
note 32.
249. See 21 CFR § 10.25(b) (2018).
250. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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The safety and efficacy of prescription drugs clearly fall within the
FDA’s statutory mandate,251 and the pleadings in both cases relied on allegations that could have supported referral to promote the working relationship
between the courts and the agency.
A.

Prudence: Should the Matter be Referred?

Once a court has decided that an issue can be referred, it must decide
whether it should be referred. The very nature of the California and Chicago
suits suggests the issue of opioid safety should have been referred to the
FDA. The California and Chicago actions were two of only three parens patriae suits of their kind pending at the time Judge Moss issued the stay,252 but
the potential for more suits making similar allegations must have been clear.
Each complaint alleges that the misrepresentations of the defendants were
associated with the recent dramatic increase in opioid related addiction and
death nationwide.253
The significance of the number of prescription overdoses leading to
death lies not only in its size but in its finer details—the number of prescription opioid overdoses has increased at least fourfold since 1999.254 Even more
significant is that the rate of both death and addiction from opioid abuse began to accelerate after Purdue Pharma’s OxyContin entered the United States
market in January of 1996.255 The opioid addiction problem was arguably
251. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2016), amended by 131 Stat. 1005 (2017).
252. The Mississippi, California, and Chicago cases were active at the time the California case was stayed. See supra note 192. The Kentucky action against Purdue Pharma for
misrepresentations regarding OxyContin was still pending at the time of the California stay,
however, the Kentucky suit alleged Purdue misrepresented OxyContin in violation of the Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) unlike the California and Chicago
cases. See First Amended Complaint, Kentucky v. Purdue Pharma LP, supra note 190, at ¶¶
33-72.
253. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 14
(“One Defendant’s own 2010 internal data shows it knew that the use of prescription opioids
gave rise to 40% of drug-related emergency department visits in 2010 and 40% of drug poisoning deaths in 2008, and that the trend of opioid poisonings was increasing from 19992008.”); Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 15 (same); Second Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at ¶ 381 (“Defendants’ creation
through false and misleading advertising of a virtually limitless opioid market has imposed
significant burdens on the community at large. Defendants’ success in extending the market
for opioids to new patients and chronic conditions has created an abundance of drugs available
for criminal use and fueled a new wave of addiction, abuse, and injury.”).
254. See Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 28.
255. See generally, Underlying Cause of Death, supra note 27; Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 28. Purdue emphasizes that the opioid addiction problem cannot be attributed solely to its product alone, claiming that the media, and others, improperly equate any
product containing oxycodone to be OxyContin. See Common Errors in the Media About OxyContin (Oxycodone HCL Controlled-Release) Tablets, PURDUEPHARMA.COM,
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sufficiently great and sufficiently well known before the California and Chicago complaints were ever filed that a court should have anticipated the need
for regulatory action. Deciding that the FDA should be asked to weigh in on
the issue of opioid safety for long-term use would have been proper.
B.

Path: Which Referral Method is Appropriate?

The California case was stayed so that the matter could be pursued before the FDA.256 The problem with the revolving stay, however unlikely, is
that it could continue indefinitely; although the FDA has a procedure for addressing primary jurisdiction doctrine referrals, the FDA is under no time
constraints to review or respond.257 Indeed, the California case remains under
at least a partial stay to this date, with status conference hearings roughly
every 180 days.258 The California court could have used its discretion to stay

http://www.purduepharma.com/news-media/2011/12/common-errors-in-the-media-aboutoxycontin-oxycodone-hcl-controlled-release-tablets/ (last accessed Mar. 22, 2017) (“Media
reports frequently and erroneously use the terms oxycodone and OxyContin interchangeably,
creating the misimpression that all oxycodone abuse involves OxyContin.”). Indeed, overdose
and addiction data sets do not differentiate between different oxycodone products, lending
some credence to Purdue’s defensive argument, but, aside from other arguments, the timing
alone of OxyContin’s entry onto the market and the dramatic rise in opioid addiction and
overdose deaths suggests that Purdue’s involvement in the opioid epidemic is more than
merely incidental. See, e.g., Mike Mariani, How the American Opiate Epidemic was Started
by One Pharmaceutical Company, THE WEEK (Mar. 4, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/541564/how-american-opiate-epidemic-started-by-pharmaceutical-company.
256. See Order of Aug. 27, 2015, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 2-3 (staying
the action). The case remained under a full stay until October 2016, when the stay was partially
lifted. See Order of Oct. 19, 2016, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 3 (lifting stay in
part). Purdue Pharma requested the full stay to be reinstated after the plaintiff filed its fourth
amended complaint. See Demurrer to Fourth Amended Complaint, California v. Purdue, supra
note 32, at 2-17.
257. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(c) (2018) (“The Commissioner will institute a proceeding
to determine whether to issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order, or take or refrain from
taking any other form of administrative action whenever any court, on its own initiative, holds
in abeyance or refers any matter to the agency for an administrative determination and the
Commissioner concludes that an administrative determination is feasible within agency priorities and resources.”); Winters, supra note 24.
258. See Order of Aug. 27, 2015, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 2-3 (staying
the action); Joint Notice Regarding Order of Aug. 27, 2015, California v. Purdue, supra note
32 (proposing 180 day status reports); see generally Docket 30-2014-00725287, California v.
Purdue, supra note 32 (scheduled status conferences: docket 529, May 11, 2016; docket 577,
Oct. 19, 2016). See Order of Oct. 19, 2016, California v. Purdue, supra note 32, at 3 (lifting
stay in part, ordering the next status conference to be February 8, 2017); see generally Docket
30-2014-00725287, California v. Purdue (scheduled status conferences: docket 684, June 21,
2017; docket 709, Nov. 29, 2017).
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the matter for a definite period, or it could have petitioned the agency itself
and given the FDA a deadline to respond.259
Some courts have, in fact, petitioned the FDA to submit a brief or otherwise respond, and the FDA has responded within the timeframe identified
by the courts.260 For example, three different U.S. District Court judges in
three different cases sent a question to the FDA pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine regarding whether and how the term “natural” could be
used to describe genetically modified ingredients in food.261 The FDA responded to all three courts via a letter dated January 4, 2014, less than six
months after the first question had been sent, declining to make a determination.262 The exchange between the three courts and the FDA demonstrates
not only that the FDA is willing to engage the courts in answering primary
jurisdiction questions, but that it will respond in a timely manner. Had either
of the courts in California or Chicago elected to use this method of referral,
the FDA’s disposition on the matter might already have been established,
thus allowing both courts to proceed having been put in a better, more knowledgeable position about the FDA’s views.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the primary jurisdiction doctrine’s guiding decisions reveals
that the core considerations a court must scrutinize in deciding whether the
doctrine should apply are whether application of the doctrine will promote at
259. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”).
260. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 130 (2d
Cir. 2009) (“As previously noted, prior to oral argument in this appeal, we invited the FDA to
submit an amicus brief to enlighten us as to its views on preemption. It did so and we may
consider the views expressed therein for persuasive value.”); Perry v. Novartis Pharma Corp.,
456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682-83 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (“Because the FDA has, at our request, filed an
amicus brief in this case, before moving on to the preemption analysis itself, we must determine the degree of deference to afford the FDA’s statements regarding the preemptive effect
of its regulations.”).
261. See Barnes v. Campbell’s Soup Co., 12-cv-05185 JSW, 2013 WL 5530017, at *9
(N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (“Accordingly, and out of respect for the FDA’s authority, the Court
GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant’s Natural
Vegetable Soups on the grounds of primary jurisdiction, REFERS the matter to the FDA for
an administrative determination, and STAYS the action for a period of six months from the
date of this Order.”); In Re General Mills, Inc. Kix Cereal Litig., 12-cv-00249-KM-MCA,
2013 WL 5943972, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2013) (“Pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.225(c), this Court
hereby refers to the FDA for an administrative determination the question of under what circumstances food products containing ingredients produced using bioengineered corn may be
labeled ‘All Natural.’”).
262. Letter from Leslie Kux, Assistant Comm’r for Policy, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
to Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, N.D. Cal., Hon. Jeffrey S. White, N.D. Cal., & Hon. Kevin
McNulty, D.N.J., 3 (Jan. 6, 2014).
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least one of the doctrine’s three core purposes, and whether the issue referred
is important or complex enough to make referral prudent and sound. Once
referral is decided, a court must choose an appropriate referral method that
will accomplish the purpose for referral without exposing the litigants to undue hardship. Analysis of the opioid epidemic and the California and Chicago
opioid litigation show that the cases can support all three doctrinal purposes
of promoting uniformity, properly utilizing agency expertise, and promoting
comity between court and agency, and that the matter probably should be
referred to the FDA. If courts engage in analysis of pleadings to identify
whether referral serves a doctrinal purpose, whether referral is prudent, and
whether the referral path is appropriate, the amorphous, borderless character
of the doctrine will begin to take definite shape.
A few observations must be made before this effort concludes. First, it
is hardly disputable that the primary jurisdiction doctrine asks much of the
courts. Primary jurisdiction asks courts to engage in decision-making regarding a doctrine that lacks definite boundaries and has received inconsistent
judicial treatment. Second, application of the doctrine in parens patriae litigation could offend principles of federalism and the power of states to protect
the health and safety of their citizens, especially where such a complicated,
important, deep, and painful problem like the opioid epidemic is concerned.
Third, a finding that the doctrine can be applied does not mean that it must
be applied—the doctrine is and should remain discretionary—but courts
should attempt to apply the doctrine where there is clear and legitimate need.
Last, litigants should be cautioned that asking a court to invoke the doctrine
does not come without risk.
Opioid manufacturers engage in a dangerous gamble by asking courts
to push the FDA to determine whether opioids are safe for long-term use.
The FDA has the power to remove unsafe products from the market or to
place significant restrictions on their use.263 Recently, the FDA used its
power to remove from the market one of the opioids being litigated in the
California and Chicago cases.264 On June 8, 2017, the FDA requested Endo
Pharmaceuticals to voluntarily recall Opana ER, an extended-release opioid

263. How Does FDA Decide When a Drug is Not Safe Enough to Stay on the Market?,
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194984.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2017).
264. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ASS’N, Press Release, FDA REQUESTS REMOVAL OF
OPANA
ER
FOR
RISKS
RELATED
TO
ABUSE
(June
8,
2017),
https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm562401.htm (last accessed Sept. 12, 2017) (FDA acted in an unexpected and unprecedented fashion when it recalled a major opioid pain reliever from the market because of safety and misuse concerns).
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analgesic which was reformulated from its original version to “deter
abuse.”265 Opana ER was deemed too dangerous:
After careful consideration, the agency is seeking removal
based on its concern that the benefits of the drug may no
longer outweigh its risks. This is the first time the agency
has taken steps to remove a currently marketed opioid
pain medication from sale due to the public health consequences of abuse.266
Even after the FDA removed Opana ER, the opioid manufacturers still
requested courts to stay litigation pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.267 Dozens of parens patriae lawsuits against the manufacturer defendants have been filed since California and Chicago brought suit, and the number may continue to grow.268 If enough of the opioid courts make use of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine to refer the issue of long-term opioid safety to
the FDA, the FDA might be convinced to subject all opioid products to
greater scrutiny. The FDA could decide that more opioids should be removed
from the market, because, like Opana ER, the risks of opioids used to treat
chronic pain outweigh their benefits.269
One thing is certain; for the primary jurisdiction doctrine to retain its
utility in the present wave of opioid litigation—and in all consumer protection litigation—courts should analyze whether referral will achieve any one
of the doctrine’s three core purposes instead of focusing analysis solely on
the necessity of an agency’s expertise. Upon finding referral is proper, courts
should evaluate and explain what core purposes referral will achieve and why
the matter is important enough to be referred. Finally, courts should utilize
any means within their power to craft referral procedures that minimize prejudice to the parties, including the ability to limit the length of a stay. The
primary jurisdiction doctrine is already a viable judicial tool, but its utility
will become even more clear if courts employ this simplified approach.

265. Id. See also Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Robert Barto, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs,
Endo Pharm., 2 (May 10, 2013) (FDA declined to label Opana ER as having abuse-deterrent
properties even though it was intended to be abuse-deterrent).
266. See FDA REQUESTS REMOVAL OF OPANA ER, supra note 264 (emphasis supplied).
267. See, e.g., Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint at 2-17, California
v. Purdue, supra note 32.
268. See collected cases, supra note 196.
269. See FDA REQUESTS REMOVAL OF OPANA ER, supra note 264.

